Information Technology\u27s Failure to Disrupt Health Care by Terry, Nicolas P.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\13-3\NVJ305.txt unknown Seq: 1 12-JUN-13 14:13
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY’S FAILURE
TO DISRUPT HEALTH CARE*
Nicolas P. Terry**
CONTENTS
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 722 R
II. Incumbents and Sustaining Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 724 R
III. High Technology Medicine vs. HIT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 727 R
IV. Health Care, HIT, and Their Market Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 731 R
V. The Value of Waiting (for New Health Care Constructs) . . . . . . 738 R
VI. Flawed Data Models: PCAST and the Parable of Google
Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 742 R
VII. Disruptive Channel Innovation and Personal Health
Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 749 R
VIII. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 756 R
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2001, the Institute of Medicine cut to the chase. Its canonical Crossing
the Quality Chasm argued that information technologies (IT) “must play a cen-
tral role in the redesign of the health care system if a substantial improvement
in health care quality is to be achieved during the coming decade.”1 Three years
later, President Bush made his optimistic commitment that, “[w]ithin 10 years,
every American must have a personal electronic medical record.”2 In 2005, an
oft-cited RAND study estimated that $80 billion per year would be saved with
a ninety-percent adoption of electronic medical records (EMRs).3 Yet, faced
with a pitiful single-digit adoption rate for EMRs,4 the Obama Administration
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1 INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 165 (2001).
2 Bush Announces New HHS Post to Facilitate Electronic Health Records, AHA NEWS
(Apr. 26, 2004), http://www.ahanews.com/ahanews/jsp/display.jsp?dcrpath=AHANEWS/
AHANewsNowArticle/data/ann_040426_Bush&domain=AHANEWS.
3 Richard Hillestad et al., Can Electronic Medical Record Systems Transform Health Care?
Potential Health Benefits, Savings, and Costs, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1103, 1107 (2005).
4 Ashish K. Jha et al., Use of Electronic Health Records in U.S. Hospitals, 360 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1628, 1631 (2009) (finding that 1.5% of hospitals had a comprehensive electronic-
records system and 7.6% had a basic electronic-records system).
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found itself embarking on a $30 billion subsidy program designed to encourage
providers to implement EMRs and other health care information technologies.5
Positive public relations material from the federal government argues that
HIT (health information technology) adoption has reached a tipping point.6
However, HIT still appears to be a large rock that only a few dedicated con-
verts are pushing up a steep and expensive hill. A long tail of less than eager
stragglers follows these converts with many of them making the journey solely
in pursuit of government largesse.7 In contrast, consumer-grade IT seems to
surround and excite us. Consumers rightfully view IT-enabled or derived prod-
ucts and services, from smartphones and search engines to online banking and
stock trading, as having transformed their lives.
Why has IT made only modest, non-disruptive inroads into health care?
This question deserves careful scrutiny. There is every indication that U.S.
health care is overdue for transformative disruption. After all, it is widely criti-
cized for delivering mediocre care and quality to a shrinking percentage of the
population with costs that are reaching crisis levels. Yet, at the same time, our
largest industry is viewed as underutilizing IT.
This Article takes the position that the HIT space either shares or reflects
the market failures of health care and that the modest attempts to correct HIT
market failure, such as EMR subsidies, still leave us short of the inflection
point. Leveraging Clayton Christensen’s terminology, it suggests that today’s
health care technologies should be classified as the “sustaining technologies” of
incumbents rather than examples of “disruptive technologies” that have
upended incumbents in other domains.8 It follows that in the absence of disrup-
tive innovation, there will likely be continued build-out of sustaining technolo-
gies that may improve the quality of care but is unlikely to have any positive
impact on the cost of or access to health care in the near future.
This Article examines four possible explanations for the difficulties faced
by HIT in disrupting health care. First, while it is widely recognized that health
care suffers from chronic market failure, the extent to which that phenomenon
also applies to HIT may not be so widely appreciated. Second, HIT is not a
good match for the current generation of health care that favors episodic rather
than process-based care. HIT may be waiting for some major structural correc-
tions to health care organizations (such as accountable care organizations) and
remuneration. Third, IT’s transformative abilities depend on its ability to inno-
vate regarding the collection, processing, and sharing of data. However, health
care lacks an amenable data standard. Fourth, the Article suggests that a truly
disruptive HIT has yet to emerge. More optimistically, however, it goes on to
5 See Suzanne Felt-Lisk et al., Toward Understanding EHR Use in Small Physician Prac-
tices, 31 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 11, 11 (2009).
6 See generally David J. Brailer, David Brailer and Farzad Mostashari: Two National
Health IT Czars Compare Notes, 31 HEALTH AFF. 475 (2012) (reviewing ten-year EMR
adoption plan).
7 Molly Merrill, Survey Reveals Docs’ Perceptions of EHRs as Potential Buyers, Users,
HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/survey-
reveals-docs-perceptions-ehrs-potential-buyers-users.
8 CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES
CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL xv (1997).
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argue that personal health technologies, exemplified by mobile platforms and
their mobile medical apps, could develop to fill such a role.
Parts II, III, and IV explore the concept of disruption and Christensen’s
work, the promise and limitations of health care technologies, and the market
failures that constrict the progress of health care and HIT. Part V examines the
“waiting” phenomenon, inquiring whether the long-predicted HIT revolution is
dependent on fundamental shifts in health care financing or delivery. Part VI
examines whether the root cause of HIT failure may be our health care data
model and draws a critical link between the iconoclastic 2010 report of the
President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST)9 on HIT
failures and the demise of Google Health. Part VII, the final section of the
Article, suggests that intrinsically disruptive mobile devices and mobile medi-
cal applications (apps) may turn out to be the first major success story of health
care disruption by IT because they can disorder the high friction, embedded
cost of location-specific medicine with a new model of “health care
everywhere.”
II. INCUMBENTS AND SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGIES
It is hard to find an analysis of U.S. health care that does not plead for
transformation. Unfortunately, this makeover has proven to be a Herculean
task. The Affordable Care Act contained just about every possible fix for our
system, except the most politically difficult (such as the public insurance
option10) or politically impossible (a single payer model11). Nevertheless, it
proved to be a particularly divisive bundle of initiatives that barely survived a
politicized challenge before the Supreme Court.12
Technology has long been viewed as having the potential to improve
access to care. “Telemedicine” began in the early twentieth-century with what
we would now call remote imaging or PACS (picture archiving and communi-
cations systems). By the 1950s, there were audio educational teleconferences,
and by the 1960s, rudimentary telemedicine networks had added video, leading
to the first remote consultations.13 Tele-homecare has been awaited for almost
a century as suggested in April 1924’s Radio News cover story entitled, “The
Radio Doctor—Maybe!”14 Almost a century later, HIT routinely is hailed as
transformative not only of access but also health care quality. Recently the
9 PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. AND TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT REAL-
IZING THE FULL POTENTIAL OF HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE HEALTH-
CARE FOR AMERICANS: THE PATH FORWARD (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-health-it-report.pdf [hereinafter PCAST].
10 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Why the Public Option Matters, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2009, 4:56
PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/08/why-the-public-option-matters/.
11 See, e.g., William C. Hsiao, State-Based Single-Payer Health Care—A Solution for the
United States?, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1188, 1188 (2011).
12 See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
13 Travis Wheeler, In the Beginning . . . Telemedicine and Telepsychiatry, 2 TELEMEDICINE
TODAY 2, 2, 4 (1994).
14 INST. OF MED., Evolution and Current Applications of Telemedicine, in TELEMEDICINE: A
GUIDE TO ASSESSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN HEALTH CARE 34, 36 (Marilyn J. Field ed.,
1996), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=5296&page=R1; see also
The Radio Doctor—Maybe!, RADIO NEWS, Apr. 1924, at 1406.
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Institute of Medicine has argued: “Just as the information revolution has trans-
formed many other fields, growing stores of data and computational abilities
hold the same promise for improving clinical research, clinical practice, and
clinical decision making.”15 Unfortunately, when there is great pressure for
change, the potential for exaggerated claims and the likelihood of disappointed
stakeholders also increase.
Health care fascinates technology experts and entrepreneurs because IT is
generally well suited to solve problems of scale, complexity, and waste. For
example, The New New Thing tells the story of Internet entrepreneur Jim
Clark’s Healtheon.16 Clark’s vision was to position Healtheon at the center of
all health care transactions, eliminate paperwork (and hence waste), and extract
profit from the savings.17 As described by author Michael Lewis: “To [Clark’s]
way of thinking there were health care professionals who clearly served a pur-
pose. They were called doctors. And there were people who clearly needed
health care. They were called patients. Everyone else in between—the hun-
dreds of billions in paperwork and bullshit—could go.”18 In the end Clark’s
vision was somewhat preempted by HIPAA’s transactional makeover19 and
Healtheon was merged with the health portal WebMD.20
In summary, Healtheon failed to “disrupt” health care transactions. That
term alludes to what Bower and Christensen labeled “disruptive technolo-
gies.”21 Such innovation is operationalized through disruptive technologies,
which are not limited to IT and may include better processes, models, etc. In
examining the concept of “disruptive innovation,” the Christensen-led literature
contrasts disruptive and sustaining technologies.22 Disruptive technologies and
resultant innovation “bring to a market a very different value proposition than
had been available previously.”23 The disruptive innovation “theory holds that
existing companies have a high probability of beating entrant attackers when
the contest is about sustaining innovations.”24 However, “established compa-
15 INST. OF MED., BEST CARE AT LOWER COST: THE PATH TO CONTINUOUSLY LEARNING
HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA S-9 (Mark Smith et al. eds., 2012), available at http://www.iom.
edu/Reports/2012/Best-Care-at-Lower-Cost-The-Path-to-Continuously-Learning-Health-
Care-in-America.aspx.
16 MICHAEL LEWIS, THE NEW NEW THING: A SILICON VALLEY STORY 19, 169 (2000). Clark
was one of the founders of Netscape. Id. at 20.
17 See id. at 99.
18 Id. at 169.
19 See AMA, UNDERSTANDING THE HIPAA STANDARD TRANSACTIONS: THE HIPAA TRANS-
ACTIONS AND CODE SET RULE 2 (2009), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/
doc/psa/hipaa-tcs.pdf. See also Transactions & Code Sets Standards, CMS.GOV (Apr. 17,
2013, 8:18 PM), http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/HIPAA-Administrative-
Simplification/TransactionCodeSetsStands/index.html?redirect=/transactioncodesetsstands/.
20 Kim Girard, Healtheon Shares Jump on WebMD Deal, CNET NEWS (May 20, 1999, 3:15
PM), http://news.cnet.com/Healtheon-shares-jump-on-WebMD-deal/2100-1017_3-226108.
html.
21 Joseph L. Bower & Clayton M. Christensen, Disruptive Technologies: Catching the
Wave, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1995, at 43, 45, available at http://hbr.org/product/dis-
ruptive-technologies-catching-the-wave/an/95103-PDF-ENG.
22 Id.
23 CHRISTENSEN, supra note 8, at xv.
24 CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, SCOTT D. ANTHONY & ERIK A. ROTH, SEEING WHAT’S
NEXT: USING THE THEORIES OF INNOVATION TO PREDICT INDUSTRY CHANGE xv (2004).
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nies almost always lose to attackers armed with disruptive innovations.”25 Ini-
tially, disruptive technologies tend to underperform (or undershoot), but they
“are typically cheaper, simpler, smaller, and, frequently, more convenient to
use” than existing mainstream products.26 In The Innovator’s Dilemma, Chris-
tensen further explained the somewhat ironic indeterminacy inherent in disrup-
tion because “[p]roducts that do not appear to be useful to our customers today
(that is, disruptive technologies) may squarely address their needs
tomorrow.”27 In contrast, “sustaining technologies” “improve the performance
of established products, along the dimensions of performance that mainstream
customers in major markets have historically valued.”28
So understood, disruptive technology seems omnipresent. Indeed, the suc-
cess of Apple, Inc.,29 is generally ascribed to its disruption of incumbent busi-
nesses (such as cell phones and music distribution). Small personal computers
known as smartphones, such as the iPhone, have disrupted the mobile phone
industry while tablets, such as the iPad, have disrupted PC markets. Video
streaming services have disrupted movie rentals stores. E-reader devices have
disrupted book publishing. Web services such as Craigslist and Angie’s List
have disrupted newspaper advertising (and so newspapers) and the Yellow
Pages. Wikipedia has disrupted Encyclopedia Britannica’s print editions.30
Disruption can be serial. Digital cameras that once disrupted film, film
cameras, and film processing markets are now themselves disrupted by
smartphones with camera apps, onboard editing, and online sharing. Disruption
has extended beyond individual products or product categories to entire indus-
tries. For example, “big box” electronic and book stores that disrupted small
retailers and department stores now are suffering at the hands of online stores
25 Id.
26 CHRISTENSEN, supra note 8, at xv.
27 Id. at 226.
28 Id. at xv. Christensen’s adaptation of his theories to health care, The Innovator’s Pre-
scription: A Disruptive Solution For Health Care was published in 2009. CLAYTON M.
CHRISTENSEN, JEROME H. GROSSMAN & JASON HWANG, THE INNOVATOR’S PRESCRIPTION: A
DISRUPTIVE SOLUTION FOR HEALTH CARE (2009). Surprisingly it makes few references to
HIT. The first claim the book makes for IT is it will be “the enabling mechanism that shifts
the locus of care . . . from solution shops to facilitated networks.” Id. at xxxiv. Such “facili-
tated networks” are collaborative online communities for physicians or for patients suffering
from the same disease. Second, that the transition to EMRs “will be the primary mechanism
of coordination among the providers in [a] disruptive value network.” Id. at xxxv. Here, the
authors assume transparent data models between EMRs and also a shift of control of the data
(again assuming the data is shareable) to patients, a prediction that explicitly references
Google Health. Id. at xxxvii.
29 At one point, Apple had the largest market cap of any company. Apple Stock Price
Touched $644, Sending Market Cap Topping $600 Bln, BESTSTOCKWATCH (Apr. 11, 2012),
http://www.beststockwatch.com/apple-stock-price-touched-644-sending-market-cap-top-
ping-600-bln.html.
30 See, e.g., ROBERT SEAMANS & FENG ZHU, RESPONSES TO ENTRY IN MULTI-SIDED MAR-
KETS: THE IMPACT OF CRAIGSLIST ON LOCAL NEWSPAPERS (2013), available at http://www.
gc.cuny.edu/CUNY_GC/media/CUNY-Graduate-Center/PDF/Programs/Economics/Course
%20Schedules/Seminar%20Sp.2013/seamans_zhu_craigslist%281 %29.pdf (research study
reporting the effect of Craigslist on the market); Joab Jackson, Encyclopaedia Britannica
Drops Print Edition, PC WORLD (Mar. 13, 2012, 4:20 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/busi-
nesscenter/article/251787/encyclopaedia_britannica_drops_print_edition.html.
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(such as Amazon).31 The financial services sector, which is somewhat compara-
ble to health care because of its scale and domination by incumbents,
reinvented itself with technology, cutting retail costs (replacing tellers with
ATMs and branches with online banking) and leveraging IT expertise to extract
value from mergers and acquisitions, but now faces disruptive payment ser-
vices contained in smartphones.32
The business-school speak “disruptive innovation” model and particularly
the work of Christensen and his colleagues have not escaped criticism from
those who study health care. For example, Kleinke’s review of The Innovator’s
Prescription memorably stated: “The book is 441 pages of postmodern busi-
ness jargon, bubble charts, and marketplace anecdote, swirled into a menacing-
sounding methodology and ladled across the entire U.S. health care system.”33
Notwithstanding, there appears to be at least descriptive value in the sus-
taining-disruption and overshoot-undershoot models at the core of the Christen-
sen-led literature. Christensen’s work is in part based on Schumpeter’s mid-
twentieth century model of “creative destruction”34 that also underlies Topol’s
The Creative Destruction of Medicine. Topol argues that the convergence of
several technologies, not least the ability to digitize humans and persistent con-
nectivity, will transform medicine: “These extraordinary accomplishments,
from dissecting and defining DNA to creating such pervasive electronic tech-
nologies that immediately and intimately connect most individuals around the
world, have unwittingly set up a profound digital disruption of medicine.”35 In
fact, the soundness of the disruptive innovation model is not critical because
much of this Article is about the prevailing narrative of HIT transformation or
disruption. It is that narrative that is driving expectations and government pol-
icy and, at least in part, should be judged against the analytic model from which
it is derived.
III. HIGH TECHNOLOGY MEDICINE VS. HIT
U.S. health care heavily invests in high technology, which suggests a para-
dox given the slow rate of adoption of HIT. However, that investment primarily
has been in sustaining technologies and not in nimbler and potentially disrup-
tive information technologies. The continued adoption of high cost technology
is symptomatic of the current health care system’s inability or refusal to tackle
31 Abram Brown, Death of Best Buy’s Big Box Store? Company Will Shift To New Model,
Close 50 Existing Stores, FORBES (Mar. 29, 2012, 5:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
abrambrown/2012/03/29/death-of-best-buys-big-box-store-company-will-shift-to-new-
model-close-50-existing-stores/.
32 See Brett King, The End Game in Disruption, FINEXTRA (Mar. 16, 2012, 3:57 PM), http://
www.finextra.com/community/fullblog.aspx?blogid=6350; Brett King, Why the iPhone 5
Means the End of the Swipe and Cards, FINEXTRA (Sept. 26, 2012, 2:12 AM), http://www.
finextra.com/community/fullblog.aspx?blogid=6967.
33 J.D. Kleinke, Perfection In PowerPoint, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1223, 1223 (2009).
34 See Creative Destruction, WIKIPEDIA (Apr. 23, 2013, 2:59 AM), http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Creative_destruction.
35 ERIC TOPOL, THE CREATIVE DESTRUCTION OF MEDICINE: HOW THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION
WILL CREATE BETTER HEALTH CARE 5 (2012).
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its escalating costs.36 These investments are made to chase reimbursement and
are emblematic of a system that provides elaborate and sophisticated care, but
only on a selective basis, while focusing on sickness rather than wellness.37
Major growth in technology utilization has been limited to secondary and terti-
ary care and to traditional technologies such as imaging.
A study that compared the availability of high cost medical technologies
across thirteen industrialized countries concluded that the United States had
above average numbers of MRI, CT, PET, and mammography and that
“[u]tilization of imaging was also highest in the U.S.”38 In a similar vein,
Emanuel and Pearson have been sharply critical of Medicare reimbursement for
proton beam therapies because of the perverse incentive that provides to esca-
late the purchase of technologies that tend to support fragmented (task-centric)
care and are remuneration-driven.39 Expenditures on such technologies are
more correlated to revenue and consistent with a health care culture that is
largely driven by reimbursable services. As a result, investments in medical
technology continue to be part of the health care “access” to services problem
rather than its solution.40
Back in 2004, then Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan testified
that “technological innovations can greatly improve the quality of medical care
and can, in theory, reduce the costs of existing treatments. But because medical
technology expands the range of treatment options, it also has the potential of
adding to overall spending—in some cases, significantly.”41 Health care over-
spending on technology is one reason why skeptics wonder whether HIT can be
even a partial solution for what ails the health care system. Bosanquet states:
“Technology is often presented for healthcare as an extraneous variable, a deus
ex machina, that can be used to explain the continuing rise in health care
costs.”42 But, as he points out, this is an inaccurate and undifferentiated view of
technology that fails to distinguish “big ticket” technologies from IT models.43
36 See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 384 (1982).
37 See Reed Abelson, An M.R.I. Machine for Every Doctor? Someone Has to Pay, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2004, at A1 (noting increasing pattern of individual doctors purchasing
expensive imaging machines in large part because of the financial incentive of
reimbursement).
38 David A. Squires, Explaining High Health Care Spending in the United States: An Inter-
national Comparison of Supply, Utilization, Prices, and Quality, 10 COMMONWEALTH FUND:
ISSUES IN INT’L HEALTH POL’Y, May 2012, at 1, 7, available at http://www.commonwealth
fund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2012/May/1595_Squires_explaining_
high_hlt_care_spending_intl_brief.pdf.
39 Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Steven D. Pearson, It Costs More, But Is It Worth More?, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 3, 2012, at A25.
40 See generally Rebecca Smith-Bindman, Diana L. Miglioretti & Eric B. Larson, Rising
Use of Diagnostic Medical Imaging in a Large Integrated Health System, 27 HEALTH AFF.
1491 (2008).
41 Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Statement Before the House of Repre-
sentatives, Committee on the Budget: Economic Outlook and Current Fiscal Issues Before
the H. Comm. on the Budget 6–7 (Feb. 25, 2004), available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/
docs/historical/greenspan/Greenspan_20040225.pdf.
42 Nick Bosanquet, Technology: Scientific Force or Power Force?, in THE ECONOMICS OF
NEW HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES: INCENTIVES, ORGANIZATION, AND FINANCING 43, 43 (Joan
Costa-Font, Christophe Courbage & Alistair McGuire eds., 2009).
43 Id. at 44–45.
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Even with this distinction between traditional health care and information
technologies clarified, HIT still presents as more sustaining than disruptive. A
2011 Booz Allen Hamilton report listed error reduction, improved collabora-
tion, better patient-care coordination, improved emergency care, patient
empowerment, patient convenience (e.g., with online appointment scheduling),
military care, and public health responsiveness as examples of HIT’s trans-
formative potential.44 For the most part, this is a consensus list of HIT pros-
pects. However, it is a list of sustaining not disruptive technologies. Only the
report’s final example, enabling “discovery in new medical breakthroughs and
provid[ing] a platform for innovation,” could be considered potentially trans-
formative or disruptive.45
A similar argument can be made about the EMR (electronic medical
record). Even the most sophisticated and comprehensive EMR (comprehensive
EMRs sometimes are labeled as EHRs (electronic health records)) is just a bun-
dle of existing technologies (Computerized Physician Order Entry, Clinical
Decision Support, e-Prescribing, Closed Loop Rx Delivery, Billing, Patient
Portal) with inputs and outputs to an EMR-based local repository of structured
data, a bundle introduced by incumbents to support existing discrete tasks.
There has been little dissent from the position that EMRs provide the
answer to many of health care’s quality and efficiency woes. But maybe it is
time we had that conversation. Growing evidence suggests that quality
improvements from basic (i.e., non-comprehensive) EMRs are marginal.46 Fur-
thermore, a controversial article in Health Affairs suggested that HIT-mediated
access to prior imaging or blood test results or other physical examinations
increased the ordering of new tests,47 whereas conventional wisdom had sug-
gested the reverse. Underperformance aside, there are also escalating questions
about the safety of HIT, particularly relating to the real-world usability of
EMRs, computerized physician order entry, and clinical decision support.48
Nemeth and Cook likely are on point when they observe: “On the surface,
healthcare work seems to flow smoothly . . . because the clinicians who provide
44 Booz Allen Hamilton, Booz Allen Lists Top Nine Ways Information Technology is Trans-
forming Health Care, BOOZ ALLEN (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.boozallen.com/media-
center/press-releases/48399320/49523820.
45 Id.
46 Max J. Romano & Randall S. Stafford, Electronic Health Records and Clinical Decision
Support Systems: Impact on National Ambulatory Care Quality, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 897, 901 (2011) (“[N]o association between EHR use and care quality for 19 indica-
tors and a positive relationship for only 1 indicator.”). See also Jesse C. Crosson et al.,
Typical Electronic Health Record Use in Primary Care Practices and the Quality of Diabe-
tes Care, 10 ANNALS OF FAM. MED. 221, 224 (2012) (“Our findings show that having an
EHR as opposed to a paper-based record-keeping system does not guarantee better care and
suggest that many practices that have adopted EHRs have not made the necessary changes to
both work processes and ways of thinking about care that would lead to improvements in
chronic illness management.”).
47 See Danny McCormick et al., Giving Office-Based Physicians Electronic Access to
Patients’ Prior Imaging and Lab Results Did Not Deter Ordering of Tests, 31 HEALTH AFF.
488, 493 (2012), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/31/3/488.abstract.
48 See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Meaningful Adoption: What We Know or Think We Know
About the Financing, Effectiveness, Quality, and Safety of Electronic Medical Records, 34 J.
LEGAL MED. 7 (2013).
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healthcare service make it so.”49 They argue that neither health care’s “com-
plex, poorly bounded, conflicted, highly variable, uncertain, and high-tempo
work domain”50 nor the clinicians’ role in making it work smoothly are trans-
parent. As they argue, “[t]he technical work that clinicians perform is hiding in
plain sight. Those who know how to do research in this domain can see
through the smooth surface and understand its complex and challenging reality.
Occasional visitors cannot fathom this demanding work, much less create IT
systems to support it.”51
Nevertheless, it is a relatively safe bet to assume a small but consistent
correlation between the introduction of EMRs (or related clinical knowledge
management systems) and reduced length of stay, reduced mortality rates, and
higher quality performance.52 We may even see greater gains as the quality of
analytics increases. For example, Cleveland Clinic has a project called DERT
(Documentation, Extraction, Reporting and Transformation) that feeds EMR
chart data into analytics software in order to flag potential complications while
the patient is still in the facility.53 It is also predicted that data outputs from
EMRs could be one of the more robust sources of health care “big data,” the
analysis of which should give public health agencies advance warnings of dis-
ease and other threats, albeit with increased privacy costs.54
However, these remain examples of essentially sustaining technologies
employed by a relatively thin slice of sophisticated incumbents. Even if they
are shown to improve health quality, serious questions remain about their effect
on the other two aspects of the health care triad: access and cost. Of course,
some “quality” improvements will translate into lower costs. For example, a
sophisticated EHR system should reduce medical and medication errors and
advanced analytic packages may detect Hospital-Acquired Conditions earlier
and generally reduce costly readmissions.55 In contrast, a high probability
exists that sustaining technologies will negatively affect both the access and
cost legs of the health care stool. Both “big ticket” scanners and partly subsi-
dized EMRs are expensive56 and tend to push the incumbents’ existing product
49 Christopher Nemeth & Richard Cook, Hiding in Plain Sight: What Koppel et al. Tell Us
About Healthcare IT, 38 J. BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS 262, 262 (2005).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 See Thomas Isaac, Jie Zheng & Ashish Jha, Use of UpToDate and Outcomes in US
Hospitals, 7 J. HOSP. MED. 85, 85 (2012).
53 Joseph Goedert, Cleveland Clinic Puts Charts to the Test, HEALTH DATA MGMT. (Oct. 4,
2011, 3:33 PM), http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/news/Cleveland_Clinic_using_
patient_chart_analytics_daily-43338-1.html.
54 See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy in the Age of Big Data, 81
UMKC L. REV. 385 (2012).
55 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality, Hospital-Acquired Conditions, NAT’L GUIDELINE CLEARINGHOUSE, http://guideline.
gov/resources/hospital-acquired-conditions.aspx (last visited May 6, 2013).
56 See, e.g., Francois M. Laflamme, Wayne E. Pietraszek & Nilesh V. Rajadhyax,
Reforming Hospitals With IT Investment, MCKINSEY Q. 1, 2 (2010), http://www.mckinsey
quarterly.com/Reforming_hospitals_with_IT_investment_2653 (“US hospitals will need to
spend approximately $120 billion” while the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act sub-
sidies will “offset only approximately 15 to 20 percent of total expenditures[,] . . . a spending
gap of about $60,000 to $80,000 a bed.”).
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(here, health care) further upmarket, which increases cost and impedes
access.57
When Steve Jobs was asked about the post-PC era,58 he replied:
When we were an agrarian nation, all cars were trucks, because that’s what you
needed on the farm. But as vehicles started to be used in the urban centers, cars got
more popular. . . . PCs are going to be like trucks. They’re still going to be around,
they’re still going to have a lot of value, but they’re going to be used by one out of X
people. . . . I think that we’re embarked on that.59
The scanners and much of the current generation of HIT, such as siloed
EMRs, are the sustaining “trucks” of health care incumbents. The transforma-
tion of health care is going to depend on the disruptive “cars” of entrant
attackers.
IV. HEALTH CARE, HIT, AND THEIR MARKET FAILURES
In its 2012 report Transforming Health Care: The Role of Health IT, the
Bipartisan Policy Center listed six barriers to effective HIT adoption. “Mis-
aligned Incentives”60 topped the list. HIT shares a sub-optimal state with gen-
eral health care markets. In the latter, this chronic form of market failure is
caused by the fact that those who pay most of the costs of health care (insurers,
themselves paid by employers) are distinct from those who choose or recom-
mend treatment (doctors) and distinct again from the patients actually consum-
ing the health care.61 As a result, the first hurdle for any HIT-transformation
argument is that the solution seems to suffer from the same disability as the
problem. In the words of a KPMG report: “Healthcare lags behind other indus-
tries, where structures, systems and incentives have made it far easier to
embrace creative dislocation.”62
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD)
2011 Health Indicators study concluded: “In the United States, health expendi-
ture has increased faster than in all other high-income OECD countries since
1970, increasing five-fold in real terms, even taking account population
57 For a slightly different but still negative take on EMRs, see KAUFFMAN TASK FORCE ON
COST-EFFECTIVE HEALTH CARE INNOVATION, KAUFFMAN FOUND., VALUING HEALTH CARE:
IMPROVING PRODUCTIVITY AND QUALITY 35 (2012), available at http://www.kauffman.org/
uploadedfiles/valuing_health_care.pdf (“The principal virtues of electronic records lie in the
realm of improving service, not reducing cost.”).
58 See Maribel Lopez, Four Ways the Post-PC Era Differs from Today, FORBES (May 1,
2012, 7:04 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/maribellopez/2012/05/01/four-ways-the-post-
pc-era-differs-from-today/.
59 John Paczkowski, Apple CEO Steve Jobs Live at D8: All We Want to Do is Make Better
Products, ALL THINGS D (June 1, 2010, 5:45 PM), http://allthingsd.com/20100601/steve-
jobs-session/.
60 BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., TRANSFORMING HEALTH CARE: THE ROLE OF HEALTH IT 5
(2012), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Transforming%20Health%20Care.pdf.
61 See generally Steven M. Teutsch & Marc L. Berger, Misaligned Incentives in America’s
Health: Who’s Minding the Store?, 3 ANNALS FAM. MED. 485, 486 (2005).
62 KPMG INT’L, ACCELERATING INNOVATION: THE POWER OF THE CROWD 12 (2012) [here-
inafter KPMG, ACCELERATING INNOVATION] , http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAnd
Insights/ArticlesPublications/accelerating-innovation/Documents/ehealth-implementation.
pdf.
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growth.”63 The differences are qualitative as well as quantitative. The U.S.
health care system compares unfavorably to other highly developed countries
on dimensions such as access, patient safety, coordination, efficiency, and
equity.64 Analyzing data from thirteen industrialized countries, a Common-
wealth Fund report found that the United States spends more than seventeen
percent of its GDP on health care compared to twelve percent or less in other
countries.65 Contrary to arguments frequently made, the disparity is not due to
higher income, the size of the elderly population, or smoking rates in the
United States.66 The only correlations were “higher prices and perhaps more
readily accessible technology and greater obesity.”67 Unfortunately, the same
study confirmed prior findings that “make clear that, despite high costs, quality
in the U.S. health care system is variable and not notably superior to the far less
expensive systems in the other study countries.”68
Baicker and Chandra acknowledge: “In an efficient system, more spending
on health care would be a sign of prosperity and a harbinger of improved health
and longevity, not a cause for concern.”69 However, they find our observed
pattern of spending troubling because of increases in federal spending and
because “health care resources are not being spent efficiently (and may not
even be the primary driver of improved outcomes): we are neither allocating
resources efficiently between health and other uses, nor getting as much health
as we could for every dollar spent.”70 As to the former concern, government
spending is projected to be fifty percent of national health expenditures by
63 OECD, HEALTH AT A GLANCE 2011: OECD INDICATORS 10 (2011), available at http://
www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/health-at-a-glance-2011_health_
glance-2011-en. OECD countries on average spent 9.6% of their GDP on health care in
2009. Id. at 150. The U.S. spent 17.4%. Id. CMS’ National Health Expenditure Projections
for 2010–2020 estimate an annual growth in expenditures of over 6%, consuming 19.4% of
GDP by 2019. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE
PROJECTIONS FOR 2010–2020, at 1, 4 (2009), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-
and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/proj
2010.pdf. See also Sean P. Keehan et al., National Health Spending Projections Through
2020: Economic Recovery and Reform Drive Faster Spending Growth, 30 HEALTH AFF.
1594, 1594 (2011) (“National health spending is expected to grow 5.8 percent per year for
the period 2010 through 2020, 1.1 percentage points faster than the expected average annual
rise in gross domestic product. As a result, the health share of the gross domestic product is
projected to increase from 17.6 percent in 2009 to 19.8 percent by 2020.”).
64 KAREN DAVIS, CATHY SCHOEN & KRISTOF STREMIKIS, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, MIR-
ROR, MIRROR ON THE WALL: HOW THE PERFORMANCE OF THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
COMPARES INTERNATIONALLY v (2010), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/
media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2010/Jun/1400_Davis_Mirror_Mirror_on_the_
wall_2010.pdf.
65 Squires, supra note 38, at 3.
66 Id. at 2–4.
67 Id. at 2. See also Gerard F. Anderson et al., It’s The Prices, Stupid: Why the United States
Is So Different From Other Countries, 22 HEALTH AFF. 89, 89 (2003).
68 Squires, supra note 38, at 9.
69 Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Aspirin, Angioplasty, and Proton Beam Therapy:
The Economics of Smarter Health-Care Spending 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City
Econ. Policy Symposium, Achieving Growth Amid Fiscal Imbalances Paper No. 2, Aug.
25–27, 2011), available at http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/sympos/2011/2011.Baickerand
Chandra.paper.pdf.
70 Id. at 2.
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2021,71 and the Congressional Budget Office estimates that spending on federal
health care programs will double to ten percent of GDP in 2037.72
Health economist Austin Frakt identifies several types of market failure
that impact health care. These include general failures of competition,73 public
goods problems associated with entitlement programs, and information asym-
metries leading to “supplier-induced demand” (part of the misaligned incen-
tives problem).74 As Gawande has remarked: “Health-care costs ultimately
arise from the accumulation of individual decisions doctors make about which
services and treatments to write an order for. The most expensive piece of med-
ical equipment, as the saying goes, is a doctor’s pen.”75 Frakt further relates
how such failures are exacerbated by market failures in health insurance mar-
kets. Again, there is failure of competition because of concentration and non-
commodified products exacerbated by information asymmetries (though here
based on moral hazard-inducing patient information). In addition, health insur-
ance markets are incomplete because insurers do not offer lower cost (and
reduced profit) plans.76 The U.S. health care system’s relative lack of vertical
integration and the fact that health care and health insurance markets are sepa-
rate create additional and compounding-informational asymmetry-based market
failures.
In general, incumbents avoid competing with their own existing products
or services by themselves introducing lower cost alternatives. This is for good
reason because most attempts to go against this trend fail.77 Consistent with
this model, health care incumbents have shown little ability to pivot, let alone
be self-disruptive, no doubt in part because the industry has been built on ever-
more byzantine layers of relationships and processes. As Starr observed thirty
years ago: “The array of organizational forms in medicine is now extraordina-
rily complex.”78 Indeed, self-disruption (or internal transformation) is quite dif-
71 Sean P. Keehan et al., National Health Expenditure Projections: Modest Annual Growth
Until Coverage Expands and Economic Growth Accelerates, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1, 10 (2012).
72 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE 2012 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 1 (2012), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/06-05-Long-Term_Budget_Out
look.pdf.
73 Austin Frakt, Health Insurance Market Failures (and What Can Be Done About Them),
INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Feb. 16, 2011, 8:04 AM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/word
press/health-insurance-market-failures-and-what-can-be-done-about-them/. Essentially,
Frakt identifies highly concentrated local hospital markets exacerbated by a lack of com-
modification in health care services that leads to “competition” between unequal products
that enjoy natural monopolies.
74 See JAMES W. HENDERSON, HEALTH ECONOMICS & POLICY 81–89 (4th ed. 2009).
75 Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, NEW YORKER (June 1, 2009), http://www.new
yorker.com/reporting/2009/06/01/090601fa_fact_gawande.
76 See Frakt, supra note 73.
77 See, e.g., Micheline Maynard, Delta to Discontinue Its Low-Fare Song Airline, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 28, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/28/business/28cnd-air.html (dis-
cussing closure of “Song,” a Delta Airlines low cost brand, and other failed discount secon-
dary brands). See also discussion supra of market failure associated with health insurers
failing to offer low cost products and text accompanying note 76. R
78 STARR, supra note 36, at 439–40.
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ficult and seen only in rare organizations that put the creation of value for their
customers ahead of profit maximization.79
The high level of market failure exhibited by health care points to incum-
bent failure to innovate or provide customer satisfaction and suggests the
domain is ripe for disruption. This brings us to the question of whether incum-
bent-proffered health care is overshooting consumer needs. Overshooting and
undershooting are key aspects of the Christensen disruption model. Markets are
ripe for disruption when incumbents’ products overshoot the needs of consum-
ers while early iterations of disruptive products will tend to undershoot the
needs of most consumers.80 Undershooting can be loosely translated by the
popular phrase: “The next big thing is always beneath contempt.”81 A classic
example is Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer’s reaction to the first iPhone:
“There’s no chance that the iPhone is going to get any significant market share.
No chance.”82 Presumably Ballmer downplayed the threat of the new device
because of its high price point in comparison to other products in the phone
market marketed by experienced incumbents. In reality, the iPhone was a
mobile computer that included a phone “app” which, in classic disruptive fash-
ion, undershot the incumbent-dominated market for computers.
Christensen, Bohmer, and Kenagy assert that traditional health care exhib-
its overshoot, stating: “Our major health care institutions . . . have together
overshot the level of care actually needed or used by the vast majority of
patients.”83 That leads them to make the familiar disruption argument: “The
pace of sustaining innovation nearly always outstrips the ability of customers to
absorb it. That creates the potential for upstart companies to introduce disrup-
tive innovations—cheaper, simpler, more convenient products or services that
start by meeting the needs of less-demanding consumers.”84
79 See James Allworth, Steve Jobs Solved the Innovator’s Dilemma, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct.
24, 2011, 11:38 AM), http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2011/10/steve_jobs_solved_the_innovato.html.
80 Bower & Christensen, supra note 21, at 49–50 (“A simple graph plotting product per-
formance as it is defined in mainstream markets on the vertical axis and time on the horizon-
tal axis can help managers identify both the right questions and the right people to ask. First,
draw a line depicting the level of performance and the trajectory of performance improve-
ment that customers have historically enjoyed and are likely to expect in the future. Then
locate the estimated initial performance level of the new technology. If the technology is
disruptive, the point will lie far below the performance demanded by current customers.”).
81 John Lilly, Computers = Trucks, JOHN’S TUMBLR (May 25, 2012), http://lilly.tumblr.com/
post/23719699951/computers-trucks. Consider, for example, the criticisms directed at the
“Google Glass” project. Compare Roberto Baldwin, Google Glasses Face Serious Hurdles,
Augmented-Reality Experts Say, WIRED.COM (Apr. 5, 2012, 5:59 PM), http://www.wired.
com/gadgetlab/2012/04/augmented-reality-experts-say-google-glasses-face-serious-hurdles/,
with Steven Levy, Google Glass Team: “Wearable Computing Will Be the Norm”,
WIRED.COM (June 29, 2012, 3:17 PM), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2012/06/clear-
glass-leaders-googles-wearable-computing-breakthrough-explain-it-all-for-you/all/.
82 Joel Hruska, Ballmer: iPhone Has “No Chance” of Gaining Significant Market Share,
ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 30, 2007, 2:42 PM), http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/
2007/04/ballmer-says-iphone-has-no-chance-to-gain-significant-market-share/.
83 Clayton M. Christensen, Richard Bohmer & John Kenagy, Will Disruptive Innovations
Cure Health Care?, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 2000, at 2; see also John W. Kenagy &
Clayton M. Christensen, Disruptive Innovation: A New Diagnosis for Health Care’s “Finan-
cial Flu”, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., May 2002, at 62.
84 Christensen, Bohmer & Kenagy, supra note 83, at 2.
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This is a strong claim and likely wrong. A slightly different construct may
be conceded: the overshoot exists but informational asymmetries or misaligned
incentives (the consumer is not paying directly for the overshoot) render its
consequences inoperable.85Another, related view also might be conceded: over-
shooting has occurred, but patients are culturally conditioned to expect over-
shooting (even unneeded) care by doctors who provide it.86 The specifics are
unimportant because the point is that the disruption tipping point requires
health care consumers to perceive that overshoot. Through that lens, and for
most health care consumers, the care offered has yet to overshoot demand.87
That is, in the present state, consumers will take or demand as much health care
as they are being supplied. Or, as admitted by Christensen and colleagues:
“When cost is not a consideration, patients always choose the higher-perform-
ing technology.”88
Given the market failure attached to so much of health care, it is not sur-
prising that considerable attention would be given to phenomena with the
potential to disrupt. A study that pre-dated the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act of 2009 (“ARRA”) subsidy of EMRs89 surveyed primary care
physicians in eleven highly developed countries. It found six countries with
almost universal adoption of EMRs, but U.S. physicians had one of the lowest
adoption scores.90 Here, therefore, was another data point feeding the disrup-
tion narrative and, hence, the acute contemporary interest in HIT. Statistics
suggesting a low level of HIT adoption in the United States coincided with a
socio-political determination that health care was ripe for change and led
policymakers to the contemporary HIT-transformation hypothesis.
Unfortunately, just as market failures have been responsible for the high-
cost, low-quality, limited-access spiral of health care, so misaligned incentives
have impeded the development of HIT. As Christensen and Remler point out,
considerable barriers inhibit potentially disruptive IT adoption outside of the
85 Christensen and his colleagues recognize that disruptive innovation by itself may be
insufficient, further requiring conditions and context such that lower cost, disruptive services
are possible. For example, they must be free of regulatory barriers (e.g., restricting physician
extenders) and oligopolistic concentrations in health provider and insurance markets must be
dismantled (e.g., absence of lower profit health insurance products). See id. at 9; see also id.
at 2 (“We believe that a whole host of disruptive innovations, small and large, could end the
[health care] crisis—but only if the entrenched powers get out of the way and let market
forces play out.”).
86 See, e.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, Let’s (Not) Get Physicals, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/03/sunday-review/lets-not-get-physicals.html?pagewanted
=all&_r=0.
87 Obviously the exceptional case concerns uninsured patients, who are completely over-
shot. However, government safety nets aside, they lack access to any affordable health or
health insurance products or services.
88 CHRISTENSEN, ANTHONY & ROTH, supra note 24, at 197.
89 Specifically, ARRA included funding for the Health Information Technology for Eco-
nomic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) and that legislation’s Meaningful Use (MU) sub-
sidy program. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
§§ 3011, 4101, 13,001, 123 Stat. 115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 & 26
U.S.C.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr1enr/pdf/BILLS-111hr1
enr.pdf.
90 Cathy Schoen et al., A Survey of Primary Care Physicians in Eleven Countries, 2009:
Perspectives on Care, Costs, and Experiences, 28 HEALTH AFF. w1171, w1174–75 (2009).
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health care domain.91 These barriers include network externalities, low product
differentiation, training costs, switching costs, and the need for interoperability
between interlinked or dependent technologies.92 Yet, they observe, “fantastic
gains of [IT] have outweighed those barriers in most industries and aspects of
both public and private life,” leading to their question: “Why does health care
ICT [information and communication technology] lag so far behind?”93
The answer is twofold: first, patient heterogeneity94 and second, the oft-
recognized “misaligned incentives” market failure problem that undermines
U.S. health care markets.95 As to the first, the diversity of the patient popula-
tion is extraordinary. One study of trauma center records for 41,364 patients
found 1,224 different ICD-9 injury diagnoses in 32,261 different combina-
tions.96 This heterogeneous nature of the patient population is caused by a vari-
ety of factors, including demographics, genetics, behavioral factors, and
specific care contexts.97 Barriers to IT adoption caused by differences between
patients likely are exacerbated by provider heterogeneity. As noted by the
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), “widespread implemen-
tation of HIT has been limited by a lack of generalizable knowledge about what
types of HIT and implementation methods will improve care and manage costs
for specific health organizations.”98
The second, most salient, and most persistent barrier to HIT adoption has
been market failure; the normative claim that change is too slow or “a situation
in which market outcomes are not socially optimal or desirable.”99 As with
health care generally, misaligned incentives are the root cause. Oversimplified,
insurers want EMRs and HIT, while patients want more access to and control
over their data. However, the incentives are mismatched because providers, not
patients or insurers, have to pay for the non-reimbursable technology. Turning
around this HIT market failure was the task set for the Office of the National
Coordinator for Health (ONC) and the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Ser-
91 Michael C. Christensen & Dahlia Remler, Information and Communications Technology
in U.S. Health Care: Why Is Adoption So Slow and Is Slower Better?, 34 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL’Y & L. 1011, 1014–16 (2009) [hereinafter Christensen & Remler, Information and
Communications Technology].
92 Id. at 1014–15.
93 Id. at 1016–17.
94 Id. at 1019.
95 See Nicolas P. Terry, Certification and Meaningful Use: Reframing Adoption of Elec-
tronic Health Records as a Quality Imperative, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 43, 47–48 (2011).
96 John R. Clarke, Andrew V. Ragone & Lloyd Greenwald, Comparisons of Survival Pre-
dictions Using Survival Risk Ratios Based on International Classification of Diseases, Ninth
Revision and Abbreviated Injury Scale Trauma Diagnosis Codes, 59 J. TRAUMA INJ. INFEC-
TION & CRITICAL CARE 563, 563 (2005).
97 See, e.g., Jason Shafrin, Patient Heterogeneity and Comparative Effectiveness Research,
MEDPEDIA (Aug. 9, 2010, 9:19 AM), http://www.medpedia.com/news_analysis/101-Health
care-Economist/entries/41638-Patient-Heterogeneity-and-Comparative-Effectiveness-
Research.
98 AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., COSTS AND BENEFITS OF HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY v–vi (2006), http://
www.ahrq.gov/downloads/pub/evidence/pdf/hitsyscosts/hitsys.pdf [hereinafter AHRQ,
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF HIT].
99 HOWARD J. SHERMAN ET AL., ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO TRADITIONAL AND PRO-
GRESSIVE VIEWS 428 (7th ed. 2008) (emphasis omitted).
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vices (CMS) by ARRA. However, as the Meaningful Use (MU) subsidy pro-
gram has progressed through its initial stages consistent patterns of negative
strategic stakeholder behavior have emerged.100 Government cheerleading and
cherry-picked data precede the publication of a proposed HHS rule. The draft
rules are then greeted with incredulity from providers and HIT manufacturers.
CMS and ONC then reduce their expectations only to see providers miss their
marks. After that, the cycle starts up again with positive progress seen in quan-
titative benchmarks but disappointing performance in qualitative implementa-
tion (particularly in regards to patient engagement, interoperability with other
data modules such as clinical decision support, and data interchange).101
According to the current ONC coordinator: “In 2016, it’s going to be the
[sic] rare to find a doctor without EHRs.”102 That level of implementation is
going to be difficult to achieve. Many facilities (e.g., long-term acute care,
rehabilitation, and psychiatric hospitals) are ineligible for the ARRA-MU sub-
sidy and are adopting EMRs at a far slower rate than those receiving subsi-
dies.103 Among the eligible doctors and hospitals, a noticeable gap in adoption
has opened up with far lower adoption rates among nonteaching and rural hos-
pitals,104 among physicians fifty-five and older, or in small practices.105 Over-
all, a growing divide exists between HIT enabled providers and the technology-
poor doctors and facilities previously identified as most in need of HIT—those
“smaller clinics and practices where most Americans receive their health
care.”106
Even assuming that something close to the coordinator’s predicted level of
adoption is achievable the technical abilities of most installed EMRs are sus-
pect. According to a 2012 survey, while almost 35% of acute care hospitals had
adopted EMRs by 2011, only 8.8% had comprehensive systems.107 It is only
these comprehensive systems that make a real quality difference108 because of
their patient engagement potential, data exchange capabilities, or integration
100 See generally Terry, supra note 95; Nicolas P. Terry, Anticipating Stage Two: Assessing
the Development of Meaningful Use and EMR Deployment, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 103
(2012).
101 See generally Terry, supra note 48, 8, 18–21, 28–31.
102 Diana Manos, Mostashari: “Keep Our Eyes on the Prize”, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Apr.
26, 2012), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/mostashari-keep-our-eyes-prize.
103 Larry Wolf, Jennie Harvell & Ashish K. Jha, Hospitals Ineligible for Federal Meaning-
ful-Use Incentives Have Dismally Low Rates of Adoption of Electronic Health Records, 31
HEALTH AFF. 505, 505–06 (2012).
104 Catherine M. DesRoches et al., Small, Nonteaching, and Rural Hospitals Continue to Be
Slow in Adopting Electronic Health Record Systems, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1092, 1095 (2012).
105 Sandra L. Decker, Eric W. Jamoom & Jane E. Sisk, Physicians in Nonprimary Care and
Small Practices and Those Age 55 and Older Lag in Adopting Electronic Health Record
Systems, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1108, 1108 (2012).
106 David Blumenthal & Marilyn Tavenner, The “Meaningful Use” Regulation for Elec-
tronic Health Records, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 501, 501 (2010).
107 DUSTIN CHARLES, MICHAEL FURUKAWA & MEGHAN HUFSTADER, OFFICE OF NAT’L
COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD SYSTEMS AND
INTENT TO ATTEST TO MEANINGFUL USE AMONG NON-FEDERAL ACUTE CARE HOSPITALS IN
THE UNITED STATES: 2008–2011, at 1, 4 (2012), available at http://www.healthit.gov/media/
pdf/ONC_Data_Brief_AHA_2011.pdf.
108 See, e.g., Karen C. Nanji et al., Errors Associated with Outpatient Computerized Pre-
scribing Systems, 18 JAMA 767, 772 (2011); Johanna I. Westbrook et al., Effects of Two
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with other HIT modules such as clinical decision support. Yet, there is little
indication that the penetration of comprehensive systems will increase dramati-
cally. Indeed, it is the data exchange and other mandated sophisticated uses that
increasingly lead providers to push back on MU initiatives.109
The laudable goals of the MU’s architects notwithstanding, the subsidy
program may well grow low-level HIT (siloed EMRs) but will do compara-
tively little to incentivize the sophisticated technology we really care about.
Such transformative HIT primarily will be found, as it is today, in very large
vertically integrated systems. Not only are those systems owned by incumbents,
but incumbents already tending to do the right things, such as moving away
from task-oriented to process-oriented care. In contrast, the vast majority of
providers, those who are not transforming their care models, may simply slide
siloed EMRs into their existing defective workflows as they too become vic-
tims of the IT productivity paradox.110
V. THE VALUE OF WAITING (FOR NEW HEALTH CARE CONSTRUCTS)
As the old saying goes, “no plan survives contact with the enemy.”111 And
HIT’s enemy may well turn out to be the health care system. This section
examines a slightly different explanation for HIT’s struggle to disrupt: disrup-
tive innovation is biding its time, waiting for some broader health care issues to
be resolved before it generates transformation.
The first explanation for such “waiting” is an eminently practical one:
health care and HIT have reached a point where their capacity to absorb change
is severely reduced. HIPAA’s unfunded mandate and privacy and security costs
were followed by e-prescribing,112 then the HITECH’s subsidy programs, and
finally by the unparalleled complexity of ACA (Affordable Care Act) initia-
tives. These programs may have taxed the transformative capacity of health
care institutions to the extent that pushing back against further change is inevi-
table. After all, it is not only MU that is finding HIT progress tough. There are
also the ongoing disputes between the federal government’s standard-setters
and health care entities over the adoption of ICD-10113 and the delays to
Commercial Electronic Prescribing Systems on Prescribing Error Rates in Hospital In-
Patients: A Before and After Study, 9 PLOS MED. 1, 5 (2012).
109 See, e.g., Letter from Rick Pollack, Exec. Vice President, Am. Hosp. Ass’n, to Marilyn
Tavenner, Acting Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Apr. 30, 2012), available at
http://www.aha.org/advocacy-issues/letter/2012/120430-cl-cms0044p.pdf.
110 See infra text accompanying notes 125–27.
111 Attributed to Helmuth von Moltke the Elder. Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, WIKI-
QUOTE, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Helmuth_von_Moltke_the_Elder (last visited May 6,
2013).
112 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-173, § 1860D-4, 117 Stat. 2066, 2087; Medicare Improvements for Patients and Provid-
ers Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-275, § 132, 122 Stat. 2494, 2527.
113 See Letter from James L. Madara, Am. Med. Ass’n, to Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary,
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Feb. 2, 2012), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/
resources/doc/washington/icd-10-comment-letter-02feb2012.pdf; Press Release, Am. Med.
Ass’n, AMA Statement in Support of HHS’ Intent to Delay ICD-10 Compliance Date (Feb.
16, 2012) (statement attributed to Peter W. Carmel, AMA President), available at http://
www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/news/news/2012-02-16-support-delay-icd-10-compliance.page;
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the enforcement of the “5010” transactional standards.114
Stakeholders also may be biding their time because today’s HIT is rela-
tively immature. Christensen and Remler argue: “[T]here are real advantages to
approaching ICT adoption carefully and waiting for the right technology to
come along before system-level adoption takes place.”115 Further, they suggest
that this “value of waiting”116 is particularly high in HIT “because the costs of
adopting the wrong type of ICT are so much higher: the risks and irreversible
consequences of technical errors and the consequences of lock-in into a subop-
timal technology.”117 Thus, some providers may be waiting for the deprecation
of barriers to HIT adoption such as high cost (even subsidized) or low quality.
Large indeterminacies in the total cost of ownership of EMRs remain while
vendors move in and out of the market118 and potential HIT purchasers wait for
consolidation or other changes in HIT or EMR markets.
Another obvious reason to wait is the toxic nature of the political environ-
ment. Specifically, stakeholders are worried by the indeterminacies surrounding
the ACA.119 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court upholding the legislation120
and the subsequent re-election of President Obama, there are many regulatory
indeterminacies remaining, and a bitterly divided federal legislature that will
continue to make ACA an election issue in the future. ACA is important in the
HIT narrative because of the tight relationship between health care reform and
HIT adoption in ACA’s more integrated care and reimbursement models, pro-
cess-based models that better match IT. As Christensen and colleagues have
argued: “Third-party reimbursement systems sap motivation for innovation—
particularly disruptive innovation—out of the system.”121 Along similar lines,
the Bipartisan Policy Center sees HIT as awaiting better-aligned incentives,
payment based on quality outcomes and value rather than the current volume
model.122 Overall, HIT will prove a better fit for an ACA-reformed health care
system.
see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HHS Announces Intent to
Delay ICD-10 Compliance Date (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.cms.gov/ICD10/Downloads/
HHSPressReleaseICD10final321612.pdf. See also Tom Sullivan, AMA Adds New Wrinkle to
ICD-10 Delay: ICD-11, GOV’T HEALTH IT (June 20, 2012), http://www.govhealthit.com/
news/ama-adds-new-wrinkle-icd-10-delay-icd-11?topic=30,31,29,34.
114 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Extension of Enforcement Discre-
tion Period for Updated HIPAA Transaction Standards Through June 30, 2012 (Mar. 15,
2012), available at http://www.cms.gov/ICD10/Downloads/EnforcementDiscretion
Announcement.pdf.
115 Christensen & Remler, Information and Communications Technology, supra note 91, at
1024.
116 Id. at 1030.
117 Id.
118 See, e.g., Jim Molpus, Meaningful Use or Useful Life? Can Both Exist?, HEAL-
THLEADERS MEDIA (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/page-1/TEC-2751
68/Meaningful-Use-or-Useful-Life-Can-Both-Exist (discussing added costs to physician
when EMR vendor acquired by another vendor that did not have product compatible with
physician’s network platform).
119 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 25, 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.).
120 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).
121 CHRISTENSEN, ANTHONY, & ROTH, supra note 24, at 197.
122 See TRANSFORMING HEALTH CARE, supra note 60, at 17.
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A 2006 AHRQ literature review summarized the barriers to HIT adoption
as “situational barriers (including time and financial concerns), cognitive and[/
]or physical barriers (include physical disabilities and insufficient computer
skills), liability barriers (including confidentiality concerns), and knowledge
and attitudinal barriers.”123 The review crucially concluded: “Cutting across all
these categories, however, may be the need for clinical medicine as it is now
practiced in the majority of settings to undergo a major structural and ideologi-
cal reorganization, so it can be integrated with and enjoy the benefits of
HIT.”124
This approach is consistent with what we have learned about the “IT pro-
ductivity paradox.”125 The paradox notes the coincidence of vast increases in
IT deployment and a general slowing of industrial productivity. Jones and col-
leagues have argued there are some convincing explanations for the paradox,
including deficiencies in how we measure the impact of IT on complex service
industries and problems relating to usability.126 For our present purposes, their
most salient observation goes to mismanagement, that is to say, health care’s
failure to move beyond digitizing legacy workflows because “swapping out the
medical record cabinet and prescription pad for a computer is proving insuffi-
cient to realize the benefits of health IT.” Rather, what is required are “IT-
enabled processes that support teamwork, care coordination, and innovative
approaches such as interactive patient portals.”127
Walker and Carayon identified the current state, “[t]he focus on tasks (and
payment for isolated tasks),” as a “fundamental cause of the fragmentation, low
quality, and high cost of U.S. health care.”128 They contrasted process-focused
care that “coordinates the work of many care team members (including
patients, physicians, nurses, midlevel providers, lay caregivers, clinical educa-
tors, pharmacists, case managers, and call-center personnel) to provide each
patient with high-quality, efficient care across time and across all venues of
care.”129 Gawande has voiced a related criticism by decrying the over-speciali-
zation of physicians and the large number of ultra-specialized professionals
required to care for a single patient: “[W]e have amazing clinicians and tech-
nologies but little consistent sense that they come together to provide an actual
system of care, from start to finish, for people. We train, hire, and pay doctors
123 AHRQ, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF HIT, supra note 98, at 58.
124 Id.
125 See, e.g., Erik Brynjolfsson, The Productivity of Information Technology: Review and
Assessment 1 (MIT Ctr. for Coordination Sci., Working Paper No. 3417-92, 1991), available
at http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/2405/SWP-3417-26847896-CCSTR-130.
pdf?sequence=1; see also Robert J. Gordon, Does The “New Economy” Measure Up to the
Great Inventions of the Past?, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 72 (2000).
126 Spencer S. Jones et al., Unraveling the IT Productivity Paradox—Lessons for Health
Care, NEW ENG. J. MED. 2243, 2243–44 (2012); see also Health IT Policy Comm., State-
ment by the American Medical Association, AM. MED. ASS’N (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.
ama-assn.org/resources/doc/hit/ama-ehr-usability-statement.pdf (“There is a direct correla-
tion between EHR adoption and the usability of an EHR.”).
127 Jones et al., supra note 126, at 2244.
128 James M. Walker & Pascale Carayon, From Tasks to Processes: The Case for Changing
Health Information Technology to Improve Health Care, 28 HEALTH AFF. 467, 468 (2009).
129 Id.
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to be cowboys. But it’s pit crews people need.”130 A similar philosophy can be
seen behind the Choosing Wisely initiative,131 a medical specialty group-led
movement aimed at persuading their colleagues “to back off on 45 diagnostic
tests, procedures and treatments that often may do patients no good.”132 The
challenge therefore is “to move the healthcare delivery paradigm from one
where the system is the arbiter of care to one that revolves around patient-
centric personal healthcare.”133
None of this should be a surprise. The contemporary “quality” debate has
focused on the “systems” reform of health care.134 These proposed processes or
systems, from reporting to peer-review to “blameless” adverse event disclosure,
are intrinsically process-based. Similarly, calls for better integration transcend
the clinical aspects of health care. Thus, in The Innovator’s Prescription, Chris-
tensen and colleagues argued that tightly integrated providers (e.g., where the
provider and insurer are the same entity) furnished one of the best platforms for
efficiency and some disruption135 in part because “[i]ntegrated fixed-fee pro-
vider systems can, to some extent, circumvent the inertial blocking power of
guild membership because reimbursement is not an issue. They can more easily
make the decisions that are best for the overall system.”136
Supplanting fragmented or episodic care with process-based constructs is
at the heart of many next generation care models. It lies at the root of reform
proposals, such as Episode-Based Payment,137 and, when extended to a defined
population, ACA’s Medicare Shared Savings Program available to providers
who organize as Accountable Care Organizations.138 Such ideas also underpin
the patient-centered medical home (PCMH) construct. PCMH is a team-based
coordinated care model supported by leading professional organizations and
designed to provide comprehensive primary care for children, youth, and
adults.139 It should be no surprise that HIT is viewed as having a funda-
130 Atul Gawande, Cowboys and Pit Crews, NEW YORKER (May 26, 2011), http://www.new
yorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2011/05/atul-gawande-harvard-medical-school-com-
mencement-address.html.
131 CHOOSING WISELY, http://choosingwisely.org/ (last visited May 6, 2013).
132 Richard Knox, Doctors Urge Their Colleagues to Quit Doing Worthless Tests, NPR:
ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Apr. 4, 2012, 8:45 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2012/
04/04/149978690/doctors-urge-their-colleagues-to-quit-doing-worthless-tests?ps=sh_
stcathdl.
133 KPMG, ACCELERATING INNOVATION, supra note 62, at 10.
134 See, e.g., COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM. OF THE INST. OF MED., CROSS-
ING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 1–3 (2001),
available at http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2001/Crossing-the-Quality-Chasm-A-New-Health-
System-for-the-21st-Century.aspx.
135 See CHRISTENSEN, GROSSMAN & HWANG, supra note 28, at 184.
136 Id. at 201.
137 CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE QUALITY & PAYMENT REFORM, TRANSITIONING TO EPISODE-
BASED PAYMENT 1, http://www.chqpr.org/downloads/TransitioningtoEpisodes.pdf (last vis-
ited May 6, 2013).
138 See Walker & Carayon, supra note 128, at 467.
139 See Joint Principles of the Patient-Centered Medical Home, PATIENT-CENTERED PRI-
MARY CARE COLLABORATIVE, http://www.pcpcc.net/content/joint-principles-patient-cen-
tered-medical-home (last visited May 6, 2013); see also Defining the Medical Home,
PATIENT-CENTERED PRIMARY CARE COLLABORATIVE, http://www.pcpcc.net/about/medical-
home (last visited May 6, 2013).
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mental role to play in both Accountable Care Organizations and PCMH
models.140
The “waiting” model captures a further difficulty. Is HIT waiting for new
care models or vice versa? The draft regulations for Accountable Care Organi-
zations essentially required the participating providers to be meaningful users.
When the watered-down final rule was issued, MU had been deprecated to one
of many performance measures. Going in the other direction, the Bipartisan
Policy Center has argued that MU may come up short. Although MU is impor-
tant to promote the data properties necessary for “coordinated, accountable,
patient-centered models of care,” increasingly “ ‘data-rich’ environments nec-
essary for delivery system reforms will require health IT, eHealth and analyti-
cal tools that appropriately fall beyond the current and anticipated requirements
for [MU].”141
A 2010 report from the National Transitions of Care Coalition suggested
that several process-based initiatives were necessary to promote meaningful
HIT implementation for care transitions. These included interoperability stan-
dards, best practices, optimized outcome measures, and heightened opportuni-
ties for team-based care. The report also noted the “[l]ack of real incentives for
sharing information between and among all care settings, based on accountabil-
ity for sending and receiving information, as well as the ultimate outcomes of
transitions of care.”142 Not surprisingly, fragmented or episodic care attracts
fragmented HIT “solutions,” such as freestanding computerized physician order
entry or basic EMRs. The focus on supporting individual tasks (e.g., prescrib-
ing or recording patient data), rather than processes, is often a function of IT
seeking to support individual clinical units (often individuals) rather than cross-
departmental teams that should be engaging on a continuous process.143
VI. FLAWED DATA MODELS: PCAST AND THE PARABLE
OF GOOGLE HEALTH
This section examines a third explanation for the relative failure of HIT:
flaws in our current data construct. HIT insiders argue that other types of data,
such as those found in the financial services sector, are less varied and, thus,
more predictable. In contrast, patient and provider heterogeneity produce data
that is more dynamic, less structured, and constantly in flux because of scien-
tific and regulatory changes.144 The question whether our current health care
data model is too proprietary or otherwise underdeveloped is examined through
two lenses: the 2010 PCAST report and the demise of Google Health.
140 DAVID MEYERS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE ROLES OF
PATIENT-CENTERED MEDICAL HOMES AND ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS IN COORDI-
NATING PATIENT CARE 7–8 (2010).
141 TRANSFORMING HEALTH CARE, supra note 60, at 17.
142 NAT’L TRANSITIONS OF CARE COAL., IMPROVING TRANSITIONS OF CARE WITH HEALTH
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 27 (2010), available at http://www.ntocc.org/Portals/0/PDF/
Resources/HITPaper.pdf.
143 Walker & Carayon, supra note 128, at 469.
144 Milt Freudenheim, Digitizing Health Records, Before It Was Cool, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
2012, at BU1.
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In 2010, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
(PCAST) challenged the model for EMR/HIT implementation that had been
implicitly agreed to by the federal government, the HIT industry, and health
care providers.145 The report contained a sharply critical commentary on the
HITECH subsidy program. Specifically, PCAST argued that “[t]he initial
approach to meaningful use has focused on driving physicians to adopt EHR
systems that perform important quality-improving functions within the practice
and, to a lesser extent, on developing capabilities for broader sharing.”146
PCAST viewed ONC’s data sharing plans as “very modest” in contrast to a
needed “simultaneous focus on the capability for universal data exchange, able
to unleash the power of the competitive market, to produce increasingly better
and less expensive systems, and to create the ‘network effect’ that spurs further
adoption.”147
To counter this threat of merely replacing paper records siloes with elec-
tronic ones, PCAST recommended the establishment of a “ ‘universal exchange
language’ that enables health IT data to be shared across institutions; and also
to create the infrastructure that allows physicians and patients to assemble a
patient’s data across institutional boundaries.”148 Because misaligned incen-
tives would lead only to market failure, PCAST recommended ONC-CMS
build robust data exchange into Stages Two and Three of Meaningful Use.
ONC-CMS did not welcome the PCAST interference and sidestepped most of
the questions posed by the report. In August of 2011, ONC published a draft set
of metadata standards using a summary records model.149 While data sharing
has been increased in Stage Two and exchange models are expected to feature
more prominently in Stage Three, overall the MU standards continue to priori-
tize clinical integration rather than exchange.
Yet PCAST raised a fundamental question: Have we failed to adopt a data
model capable of supporting the transformation or disruption of health care? In
fact, PCAST asked and answered two quite central questions about health data.
First, while data interchange and necessary standards for the interchange have
long been part of the lexicon of EMRs and HIT, PCAST suggested a shift away
from traditional sharing models. Second, PCAST rejected the conventional
model of aggregated health information (such as a patient record), preferring a
far more disaggregated data model.
As to the first question, PCAST rejected a standardized records model for
EMRs as “doomed to failure” because of “too much diversity and incompatibil-
ity for any kind of a priori standard to emerge” and the inherent limitations of
systems based on “fixed records.”150 PCAST also rejected “service-oriented
architecture” (bilateral agreements between end-users allowing access to their
data) because of scalability issues.151 Rather, the report recommended, “[t]he
145 PCAST, supra note 9, at 3–4.
146 Id. at 3.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 4.
149 Metadata Standards to Support Nationwide Electronic Health Information Exchange, 76
Fed. Reg. 48,769, 48,769–76 (Aug. 9, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 170).
150 PCAST, supra note 9, at 39.
151 Id. at 39–40.
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best way to achieve a national health IT ecosystem is to ensure that all elec-
tronic health systems can exchange data in a universal exchange language.”152
The proposed language was “some kind of extensible markup language (an
XML variant, for example) capable of exchanging data from an unspecified
number of (not necessarily harmonized) semantic realms.”153 Evans and Wur-
ster put forward a similar model a decade earlier in Blown to Bits, arguing that
“key information standards, if driven to critical mass, would precipitate a
deconstruction of the information-bonded relations in the health care
industry.”154
The PCAST model was not simply a translational one where structured
data about a patient in one EMR would be exported into a universal exchange
language. Rather, in PCAST’s second major proposal, the data in an individual
record would be segmented (or disaggregated) into “individual data elements”
(e.g., a particular diagnosis or test). These individual data elements would be
annotated with metadata. This metadata would provide the patient identifying
information, privacy protocols, and provenance relating to those data elements.
Providers could then access, search, and process the highly scalable data with
specialized and secure search engines that would crawl the metadata.155
Overall, PCAST gained little traction because it failed to satisfy existing
stakeholders.156 It did not provide a coherent roadmap for short-term imple-
mentation and rightly set off a number of privacy and security alarms.157
Assume, however, that the security and confidentiality issues could be solved.
The PCAST data model is radically different from anything that has come out
of the MU project (indeed, it was antithetical to the technical and business
models agreed on by providers, vendors, and regulators). However, the PCAST
approach to data transparency would promote efficient data sharing with
patients and between providers, something that stakeholder pushback on the
proposed MU Stage Two requirements suggests is extremely difficult using the
data models in most current EMRs. A single data standard also would substan-
tially accelerate the collection and analysis of “big data,” itself a problematic
construct.158
Not surprisingly, because it would be built on web standards, the PCAST
data model is consistent with Zittrain’s concept of generativity: “a system’s
capacity to produce unanticipated change through unfiltered contributions from
152 Id. at 41.
153 Id. (emphasis omitted). For information on XML, see generally Extensible Markup Lan-
guage (XML) 1.0 (Fifth Edition), W3C (Nov. 26, 2008), http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-xml/;
Introduction to XML, W3SCHOOLS.COM, http://www.w3schools.com/xml/xml_whatis.asp
(last visited May 6, 2013).
154 PHILIP EVANS & THOMAS S. WURSTER, BLOWN TO BITS: HOW THE NEW ECONOMICS OF
INFORMATION TRANSFORMS STRATEGY 187 (2000).
155 PCAST, supra note 9, at 41–42.
156 For a summary of stakeholder reactions, see Vince Kuraitis, PCAST HIT Report
Becomes a Political Pin˜ata, HEALTH CARE BLOG (Jan. 23, 2011), http://thehealthcareblog.
com/blog/2011/01/23/pcast-hit-report-becomes-a-political-pinata/.
157 See, e.g., Mark A. Rothstein, Debate Over Patient Privacy Controls in Electronic Health
Records, BIOETHICS F. (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.thehastingscenter.org/Bioethicsforum/
Post.aspx?id=5139. On privacy and security, see generally PCAST, supra note 9, at 45–52.
158 See generally Terry, supra note 54.
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broad and varied audiences.”159 In contrast, today too much patient data is
trapped by the proprietary formats used in current-generation EMRs. With its
emphasis on setting free the value in patient data, the PCAST proposals might
well have enabled a platform for disruptive innovation. For example, the report
itself asserted: “An important advantage of the technological approach we have
described is that it would enable new markets where firms compete to provide
services and tools to patients, healthcare providers, payers, public health offi-
cials, and researchers.” Examples provided included “products for patients to
gather information about diseases using their personal health data, to input data
from home health monitors, or to compare healthcare providers.”160
At an earlier meeting of PCAST in August 2009, Eric Schmidt, Google’s
then-chairman and CEO and a member of the advisory council, criticized the
Obama administration over its EMR subsidy model. He argued that it would
lead to an outdated system of databases rather than patient-controlled records
based on the web.161 A year before, during the last few months of the Bush
administration, Schmidt’s company had launched Google Health. Described at
launch by then-Google Vice President Marissa Mayer as a “large ongoing initi-
ative” designed to include “thousands of partners and millions of users,”162
Google Health was a web-based personal health record (PHR) service that was
free to consumers and designed eventually to integrate with Google’s health
care provider “partners.”
The timing of the launch looked fortuitous. By 2008, the Bush administra-
tion realized that market failures were going to be fatal to its EHR project. In
contrast, Google Health’s PHR model probably appeared to be a perfect substi-
tute. PHRs would be offered directly to patients bypassing the failures in EMR
markets. PHRs were also less likely to be slowed by privacy rules because at
that time they operated in an essentially unregulated zone little touched by the
HIPAA Code.163
Yet Google Health was destined to be the “poster child” of information
technology’s failure to disrupt health care. Notwithstanding an alignment of
economic, political, and technical advantages, Google Health withered on the
vine before Google’s 2011 announcement that the product would be retired.164
That announcement read in part:
159 JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 70 (2008)
(emphasis omitted).
160 PCAST, supra note 9, at 57.
161 Bob Brewin, Google, Microsoft Executives Criticize Obama’s E-Health Records Plan,
NEXTGOV.COM (Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.nextgov.com/health/2009/08/google-microsoft-
executives-criticize-obamas-e-health-records-plan/44481/.
162 Steve Lohr, Google Offers Personal Health Records on the Web, N.Y. TIMES (May 20,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/20/technology/20google.html?_r=2&.
163 PHRs run by non-covered entities would avoid most federal regulation until HITECH’s
breach notification provisions authorizing FTC regulation. See FTC Health Breach Notifica-
tion Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 42,962 (Aug. 25, 2009) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 318) (requir-
ing vendors of personal health records and related entities to notify consumers when the
security of their individually identifiable health information has been breached).
164 An Update on Google Health and Google PowerMeter, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (June
24, 2011), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/update-on-google-health-and-google.
html.
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Google Health is not having the broad impact that we hoped it would. There has been
adoption among certain groups of users like tech-savvy patients and their caregivers,
and more recently fitness and wellness enthusiasts. But we haven’t found a way to
translate that limited usage into widespread adoption in the daily health routines of
millions of people.165
Various explanations for the demise of Google Health have been posited,
primarily those suggesting that it was increasingly difficult for Google to
engage patients in curating their own health records.166 In fact, PCAST was
prescient. Google’s PHR was built on a universal exchange language, but those
with which its creators wished it to exchange data were not. Without a common
data infrastructure and with EMR data mostly locked away for the near future
in proprietary formats, even one of the world’s largest technology companies
was unable to free the data and innovate in the health care space.
This fundamental flaw in the health care data model hindering interoper-
ability, exchange, and data transparency remains a key barrier to HIT expan-
sion. West and Friedman explain why health data sharing is so difficult by
stating: “Medical data are more voluminous and heterogeneous than financial
records. The data itself are often stored in proprietary formats, and the diversity
of legacy standards and provider practices makes interoperability difficult to
achieve.”167 In spite of HITECH-funded loans and grants (primarily through
the State Health Information Exchange Cooperative Agreement Program168)
and some notable established success stories in a small number of states,169
health information exchange implementation continues to struggle.170 There are
a large number of health information exchanges based on different models,
minimal incentives to share data, and difficulty in identifying a workable busi-
ness model or sustainable funding.171
PCAST’s criticisms of the current EMR/HIT data model persist. For
example, in a February 2012 letter to CMS and ONC, Senator Mark Warner
was critical of MU for not including “clear and robust interoperability require-
ments” and failing to fully support consumer access to and interaction with
EHR-based data.172 Particularly telling was the Senator’s observation: “If
165 Id. (italics added).
166 RIP Google Health, CHILMARK RES. (June 24, 2011), http://chilmarkresearch.com/2011/
06/24/rip-google-health/.
167 DARRELL M. WEST & ALLAN FRIEDMAN, THE BROOKINGS INST., HEALTH INFORMATION
EXCHANGES AND MEGACHANGE 4 (2012), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/
research/files/papers/2012/2/08%20health%20info%20exchange%20friedman%20west/0208
_health_info_exchange_west.pdf.
168 State Health Information Exchange Program, HEALTHIT.GOV, http://www.healthit.gov/
policy-researchers-implementers/state-health-information-exchange (last visited May 6,
2013).
169 See, e.g., Lori Stephenson & David Herr, The Beacon Communities at One Year: The
Colorado Experience, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (May 19, 2011), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/
2011/05/19/the-beacon-communities-at-one-year-the-colorado-experience/.
170 See, e.g., Phil Cauthon, KHIE Board Turns Over Regulatory Duties to State: KDHE
Now to Oversee Exchange of Electronic Health Records, KAN. HEALTH INST. (Sept. 12,
2012), http://www.khi.org/news/2012/sep/12/khie-board-turns-over-regulatory-duties-state/.
171 WEST & FRIEDMAN, supra note 167, at 7–8.
172 Letter from Mark R. Warner, U.S. Senator, to Marilyn Tavenner, Adm’r, Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., and Farzad Mostashari, Nat’l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech.,
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HITECH Act funding is used to create another generation of siloed EHR sys-
tems, we will have failed in our goal to use technology to reduce the cost of
providing exceptional health care.”173
Some of health care’s market failure problems (in the sense that health
care is not being packaged as many customers would like it) are paralleled in
other industries. Consider the following description from technology analyst
Horace Dediu: “It’s a value network of great breadth and complexity. It’s a
highly modularized industry with well-defined business model boundaries and
inter-dependencies.”174 Dediu, who studied under Clayton Christensen,175 was
talking about the television industry, but his words should resonate with those
who dissect health care.
Sub-optimal performance can be seen in the way video (primarily TV)
content is delivered to consumers. Channels are delivered in a bundle. Whether
the consumer is interested primarily in one, ten, or twenty channels, they will
be delivered in a single bundle of approximately 150.176 That bundled price is
the product of a complex series of individual transactions between the delivery
system (cable or satellite company) and the content providers (networks or stu-
dios) leading to an arcane cross-subsidization model. Again, paralleling health
care, some delivery and content systems (e.g., NBC-Comcast177) are vertically
integrated and thus create a market concentration. Consumers who wish to
reduce costs are denied unbundling because of these and other concentrations.
The forces of disruption are surrounding video distribution much as they did
with music distribution.178 However, with incumbents using concentration, ver-
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Feb. 21, 2012), available at http://thehill.com/images/
stories/blogs/healthwatch/healthitwarner.pdf.
173 Id.
174 Horace Dediu, Tele Vision, ASYMCO (Aug. 29, 2011, 1:36 PM), http://www.asymco.
com/2011/08/29/tele-vision/.
175 See Horace Dediu, WIKIPEDIA (Nov. 21, 2012, 9:09 PM), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Horace_Dediu.
176 See, e.g., Ryan Lawler, How Much Would the Average Person Pay for a Standalone
HBO GO Subscription? About $12 a Month, TECHCRUNCH (June 5, 2012), http://techcrunch.
com/2012/06/05/hbo-go-without-hbo/ (discussing economics of delivery of HBO without
any cable provider subscription); Nick Bilton, Disruptions: For HBO, Still Beholden to a
Cable Company, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2012, at B7.
177 Kristen Hamill, U.S. Approves Comcast-NBC Merger, CNN MONEY (Jan. 18, 2011, 6:06
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/01/18/technology/fcc_comcast_nbc/index.htm.
178 There are already technology-based disruptions/trends threatening the broadcast-cable
market, but they have not yet caused major change in incumbent revenue. See David Carr, A
TV Schedule in the Hands of Whoever Holds the Remote, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2012, at B3;
Philip Elmer-DeWitt, After Meeting with Apple Execs, Analyst Expects No Television Solu-
tion Any Time Soon, CNN MONEY (Aug. 24, 2012, 9:52 AM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/
2012/08/24/message-from-apple-execs-no-tv-solution-any-time-soon/; Erica Ogg, DirecTV:
Apple TV Won’t “Obsolete Our Technology”, GIGAOM (June 2, 2012, 7:55 AM), http://
gigaom.com/apple/directv-apple-tv-wont-obsolete-our-technology/ (reporting comment of
DirecTV Chairman Michael White: “Typically with technology, it smashes the cost structure
in some new way (but) with content costs, rights fees and the cost of spectrum it’s hard to
see (it) obsoleting our technology.”); Adam Satariano & Alex Sherman, Apple TV No iPhone
As Talks Bog Down with Media Companies, BLOOMBERG.COM (Sept. 6, 2012, 2:14 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-06/apple-tv-no-iphone-as-talks-bog-down-with-
media-companies.html; Jay Yarow, The Apple Television Is Coming, and This Is Why It’s
Going to Be Revolutionary, BUS. INSIDER (June 1, 2012, 10:09 AM), http://www.business
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tical integration, and geographical exclusivity (cable franchises) to protect their
markets, regulatory trust busting may be required prior to meaningful
disruption.179
As to why television has not been disrupted by technology like the music
industry has, Dediu continued: “If you look at each technological experiment to
move to a new business model, they can all be reduced to the offer of an addi-
tional or substitutive module. There is no assumption made that the content
being served will change.”180 His statement is the key to understanding the
relative lack of disruption in health care. At the care level, the U.S. health care
system is failing to offer any “additional or substitutive modules.” Video distri-
bution may well fall to the disrupters sooner than later. When it does, the man-
ner in which the complex relationships are unraveled may well serve as an
important bellwether for health care.
According to a Booz Allen Hamilton report: “As patient information
becomes digitized, researchers can now analyze large sets of anonymous data,
facilitating the rapid introduction of new therapies and better analysis on the
effectiveness of medications and treatments.”181 This is a reference to “big
data.” The big data hypothesis is that sophisticated algorithms will be used to
comb through increasingly vast repositories of data in order to discover patterns
of conditions and behaviors that will lead to better and more focused products
and services.182 As I have discussed elsewhere there are several problems with
big data, an apparently irreconcilable relationship with health privacy and its
regulation being just one.183 Notwithstanding, unless health information can be
freed from the health care silos where it currently resides and put into a com-
mon data format for processing, the opportunity for big data to transform health
care may be missed.184
Google Health was a classic example (albeit a failing one) of disruptive
innovation run by an innovator new to health care, rather than by an incumbent.
True to the Christensen-led disruption model, Google Health’s initial perform-
ance clearly was below that desired by most consumers, whether patients or
physicians. This underperformance was in the features (importing and export-
ing data), negative externalities (uncertain level of confidentiality), and infor-
mational asymmetries (what Google would do with the data collected).
Incumbents, at most, wanted to add patient portals to their EMRs primarily
insider.com/apple-television-what-to-expect-2012-6?op=1 (discussing how consumers actu-
ally want unbundled content and a cloud-based DVR).
179 See Thomas Catan & Amy Schatz, U.S. Probes Cable for Limits on Net Video, WALL
ST. J. (June 13, 2012, 12:08 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023034442
04577462951166384624.html.
180 Dediu, supra note 174.
181 Allen, supra note 44.
182 See JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., BIG DATA: THE NEXT FRONTIER
FOR INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY 5 (2011), available at http://www.mck-
insey.com/~/media/McKinsey/dotcom/Insights%20and%20pubs/MGI/Research/Technology
%20and%20Innovation/Big%20Data/MGI_big_data_full_report.ashx.
183 See, e.g., Terry, supra note 54, at 385–86.
184 KAUFFMAN, supra note 57, at 20 (“Merely uploading information into a database is not
very useful if the data are in a multiplicity of formats that cannot ‘talk’ to each other or be
easily compared. Nor can information be compared widely if semantics are not
standardized.”).
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because insurers and employers were hoping such would promote positive
lifestyle changes and resultant cost savings.
Google Health was very low priced (it was free). If Google had been able
to ramp-up, access more curated data (through a common language), and pro-
vide additional value to patients and data end-users, it could have been seri-
ously disruptive. Unfortunately, Google missed an important trait of the
undershooting model. Although disruptive technologies initially tend to
underperform, they are “typically cheaper, simpler, smaller, and, frequently,
more convenient to use” than existing mainstream products.185 Google knew it
wanted to harvest health information about its users that it could sell to adver-
tisers. However, it failed to convince its users that the product had any, even
underperforming, value to them.
VII. DISRUPTIVE CHANNEL INNOVATION AND PERSONAL
HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES
So far this article has posited three explanations for the struggle that HIT
has faced in disrupting health care. First, HIT suffers from similar market fail-
ures as health care generally, rendering widespread adoption problematic. Sec-
ond, and closely linked to the first, HIT is waiting for some major structural
corrections to health care such as process-based organization and remuneration.
Third, although IT typically transforms industries by changing the way data is
collected, shared, and processed, health care lacks an amenable data standard.
This section poses a fourth explanation: a truly disruptive HIT agent or technol-
ogy has not yet emerged. This pessimistic note then is itself challenged with an
examination of personal health technologies, exemplified by mobile computing
platforms and their downloadable mobile medical apps.
If the Christensen-led literature is correct, disruptive innovation in health
care should begin with products that exhibit a different value proposition from
those sold by incumbents. Such products will likely underperform initially, but
may be smaller, simpler, or more convenient. They also should prosper in the
pricing overhangs left by incumbents and offer “additional or substitutive mod-
ules.” Personal health technologies seem to fit this model and potentially may
create “Healthcare Everywhere.”
One of the classic weaknesses of our current health care model is that it is
resolutely location specific. Health care is available only in certain locations,
whether in clinics, hospitals, medical buildings, or emergency rooms. Since the
demise of the Marcus Welby MD-era culture of home visits, patients have been
the only stakeholders routinely required to travel.186 Primarily they trek to
brick-and-mortar facilities. Frequently such facilities are in disjointed locations
emphasizing their task-specific nature (primary, secondary, tertiary, radiogra-
phy, labs, etc.) and highlighting the episodic, individually billed nature of
health care services. Cost, quality, and access are all implicated. These tradi-
tional facilities are major cost centers while the friction involved in appoint-
ments and travel discourages preventive care.
185 CHRISTENSEN, supra note 8, at xv.
186 Marcus Welby, M.D., WIKIPEDIA (Mar. 24, 2013, 2:46 PM), http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Marcus_Welby,_M.D.
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Health care delivery has high friction. For patients, it is difficult and costly
(in several senses) to choose providers, get appointments, acquire convenient
medical information and advice, make decisions as to procedures, etc. Beyond
the clinical space, there is immense friction at the financing stage, forms,
approvals, acquiring receipts, not to mention negotiating with insurers and a
multitude of other agents such as flexible savings account and pharmacy bene-
fit managers.
In Seeing What’s Next, Christensen and colleagues discuss the potential of
health care disruption with innovations as varied as home pregnancy tests and
freestanding ambulatory surgical centers. They argue: “In each case, caregivers
with less training became capable of providing effective care in more conve-
nient, less expensive venues—care that historically had required expensive
experts located in inconvenient, costly facilities.”187
One of the more interesting brick-and-mortar channel innovations in
health care delivery has been the retail medical clinic, sometimes referred to as
a “doc-in-the-box.”188 These clinics are often housed in large, popular retail
stores189 and are typically staffed by physician extenders.190 A RAND study
found that from 2007 to 2009, the use of such clinics increased ten-fold, with
geographical proximity being the strongest predictor of use.191 This growth has
occurred despite consistent opposition from professional organizations, such as
the AMA.192 If such clinics do cause disruption, it will be by offering low-cost,
high-convenience care leveraging supply chain sophistication and customer
analytics unknown in traditional health care.193 The disruptive potential of
187 CHRISTENSEN, ANTHONY & ROTH, supra note 24, at 181.
188 See, e.g., Nicolas P. Terry, Prescriptions sans Frontie`res (or How I Stopped Worrying
About Viagra on the Web But Grew Concerned About the Future of Healthcare Delivery), 4
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 101, 172–74 (2004) [hereinafter Terry, Prescriptions
sans Frontie`res]; see also Craig Evan Pollack & Katrina Armstrong, The Geographic Acces-
sibility of Retail Clinics for Underserved Populations, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 945,
945 (2009), available at http://archinte.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=414985.
189 See, e.g., Julie Appleby & Sarah Varney, Wal-Mart Plans Ambitious Expansion into
Medical Care, NPR NEWS (Nov. 9, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/
2011/11/10/142156478/wal-mart-plans-ambitious-expansion-into-medical-care; Jackie
Crosby, Target Inches into Medical Clinic Business, STAR TRIB. (Sept. 14, 2010, 7:35 PM),
http://www.startribune.com/business/102656069.html.
190 See, e.g., Bruce Japsen, More Health Clinics Pop Up Inside Retailers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
9, 2012, 6:00 PM), http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/09/more-health-clinics-
pop-up-inside-retailers; see also CVS.COM, http://www.minuteclinic.com/ (last visited May
6, 2013).
191 J. Scott Ashwood et al., Trends in Retail Clinic Use Among the Commercially Insured,
17 AM. J. MANAGED CARE e443, e444–45 (2011); see also Ateev Mehrotra & Judith R.
Lave, Visits to Retail Clinics Grew Fourfold from 2007 to 2009, Although Their Share of
Overall Outpatient Visits Remains Low, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2123, 2124 (2012).
192 See, e.g., Pamela Lewis Dolan, AMA Meeting: Delegates Seek More Oversight of Retail
Clinics, AM. MED. NEWS (July 16, 2007), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2007/07/16/
prl20716.htm; Pamela Lewis Dolan, AMA Toughens Stance on Retail Health Clinics, AM.
MED. NEWS (July 4, 2011), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2011/07/04/prsk0704.htm.
193 See Roger Foster, Reducing Healthcare Administrative Inefficiencies with Big Data,
GOV’T HEALTH IT (May 22, 2012), http://www.govhealthit.com/news/reducing-healthcare-
inefficiencies-big-data?page=0,1; see also Chad Terhune, In-store Clinics Look To Be a
Remedy for Healthcare Law Influx, L.A. TIMES (July 30, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/
2012/jul/30/business/la-fi-clinic-medical-care-20120730.
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these clinics has increased because of the hybrid clinic/online model, which
combined in-store clinics with access to online health care advice194 or in-store
diagnostic “pods.”195
Even with this hybrid twist, such clinics are not truly disruptive. They are
at best interesting sustaining plays by incumbents (pharmacies and health insur-
ers). The online aspects of hybrid models retain some legal risks196 while clin-
ics owned by health insurers seem to exhibit channel conflict. In a sense, walk-
in medical clinics are really part of an emerging patchwork safety net for unin-
sured and underinsured patients, the very existence of which somewhat per-
versely supports the continued existence of low-access, high-quality health
care.
In contrast, true channel innovation and a more extreme disruptive force
may be seen in the growth of mobile apps. Mobile broadband and smartphone
computing platforms permit omnipresent and location-neutral technologically
mediated health care. Mobile platforms are highly disruptive and mobile plat-
forms with app stores are promoting disruptive innovation across all domains,
many of which have been controlled by incumbents.197 Michael Saylor predicts
that a pervasive mobile computing platform “will cause companies to replace
their physical products and services with software equivalents, and it will cause
companies to extend their business processes beyond the four walls of the busi-
ness and out to the software resident on their consumers’ mobile
computers.”198
Currently there are more than six billion devices connected to mobile net-
works. This number is predicted to rise to nine billion by 2017, exceeding the
194 The online play is from NowClinic, part of the OPTUMHealth group owned by
UnitedHealth Group the parent company of health insurer UnitedHealthcare. See
NOWCLINIC, http://www.mynowclinic.com (last visited May 7, 2013). Its hybrid character
comes from the fact that Rite Aid pharmacies and OptumHealth now offer access to
NowClinic in the former’s Detroit-area stores. Rite Aid and OptumHealth Introduce
NowClinicSM Online Care Services in Detroit, RITEAID.COM (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.
riteaid.com/company/news/news_details.jsf?itemNumber=1489. See also Pamela Lewis
Dolan, Rite Aid Clinics Place New Twist on “Doc-in-a-Box”, AM. MED. NEWS (Feb. 6,
2012), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2012/02/06/bil20206.htm.
195 For example, Care4 Stations are self-contained kiosks that are fully enclosed for privacy
and equipped with various diagnostic interfaces wirelessly linked back to the remote
caregivers. Press Releases, HEALTHSPOT, http://www.healthspot.net/about/news/mission.
html (last visited May 7, 2013). Conceptualized as “medical ATMs,” these kiosks are
designed for installation in pharmacies, retail stores, or workplaces. Brian Dolan, HealthSpot
Adds Sprint 4G, E-Stethoscope to Kiosks, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Feb. 20, 2012), http://mobi
healthnews.com/16389/healthspot-adds-sprint-4g-e-stethoscope-to-kiosks.
196 See, e.g., Terry, Prescriptions sans Frontie`res, supra note 188, at 175–76 (discussing
closure of MyDoc.com).
197 See, e.g., Peter Wayner, Monitoring Your Health with Mobile Devices, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/23/technology/personaltech/monitoring-your-
health-with-mobile-devices.html?ref=technology; see also Milt Freudenheim, As
Smartphones Become Health Aids, Ads May Follow, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2012, at B3.
198 MICHAEL SAYLOR, THE MOBILE WAVE: HOW MOBILE INTELLIGENCE WILL CHANGE EVE-
RYTHING 6 (2012).
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global population.199 Smartphones, the mobile platforms that allow apps, now
account for half of phones used in the United States and dominate sales of new
devices.200 Health care and medical app downloads will reach 44 million in
2012 and 142 million in 2016.201 By then, three million patients will be using
smartphone-enabled remote patient monitoring.202 Overall, 2012’s $150 mil-
lion market for mobile medical applications will grow by twenty-five percent
annually for the following five years.203 There are signs of serious investment
in mobile medical apps from incumbents, such as pharmaceutical companies204
and venture capitalist funds.205
Many of the first health care apps qualify only as sustaining technologies.
For example, providers of journals, books, and services that previously existed
in paper or on the web now make app versions or supplements. As the resolu-
tion of smartphone screens increase, they are increasingly being used for
image-based diagnostics.206 Additionally, incumbent providers of health care
or health insurance products are distributing apps that locate providers and pro-
vide coverage information.207 App stores are full of simple personal health
records, reminders, health information calendars (recording everything from
food intake, menstrual cycles, and fetal growth). Many nascent web services
providing information (including quality ratings) about providers are likely to
199 Juliette Garside, More Mobile Devices Than People “Within Five Years”, THEGUAR-
DIAN (June 6, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/jun/06/more-
mobile-devices-people-five-years; see also Fred Wilson, Mobile Is Where the Growth Is,
AVC: MUSINGS OF A VC IN NYC (July 1, 2012), http://www.avc.com/a_vc/2012/07/mobile-
is-where-the-growth-is.html.
200 Smartphones Account for Half of All Mobile Phones, Dominate New Phone Purchases in
the US, NIELSEN WIRE (Mar. 29, 2012), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online_mobile/
smartphones-account-for-half-of-all-mobile-phones-dominate-new-phone-purchases-in-the-
us.
201 Brian Dolan, Report: 44M Health App Downloads in 2012, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Nov. 30,
2011), http://mobihealthnews.com/15029/report-44m-health-app-downloads-in-2012/.
202 Anthony Cox, Press Release: mHealth Users of Remote Health Monitoring to Reach 3
Million by 2016: Smartphones Play Leading Role, JUNIPER RES. (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.
juniperresearch.com/viewpressrelease.php?pr=285.
203 Joseph Goedert, Kalorama Tracks Mobile Medical App Market, HEALTH DATA MGMT.
(June 12, 2012, 5:25 PM), http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/news/mobile-medical-
apps-applications-market-kalorama-44597-1.html.
204 See, e.g., Brian Dolan, Pharma Investments in Apps, Web Rise 78 Percent,
MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Feb. 16, 2011), http://mobihealthnews.com/10249/pharma-investments-
in-apps-and-web-rise-78-percent/.
205 Anna Edney, iPad Toting Doctors Spur Venture Funding in Medical Apps, BLOOMBERG
(June 18, 2012, 7:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-18/oprah-aids-doc-
tors-as-app-investments-soar-health.html.
206 See, e.g., Ce´dric Lamirel et al., Nonmydriatic Digital Ocular Fundus Photography on
the iPhone 3G: The FOTO-ED Study, 130 ARCHIVES OPHTHALMOLOGY 939, 939 (2012).
207 See ROBERT OSCAR, HEALTH IT LAW & INDUSTRY REPORT, ANSWERING THE CALL:
USING SMARTPHONE TECHNOLOGY TO OPTIMIZE HEALTH CARE 1–2 (2012); Justin Montgom-
ery, UnitedHealthcare Debuts “Health4Me” Mobile App for iOS Devices, Coming Soon for
Android, MHEALTHWATCH (Feb. 27, 2012), http://mhealthwatch.com/unitedhealthcare-
debuts-health4me-mobile-app-for-ios-devices-coming-soon-for-android-18938/.
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be embraced by app stores208 as will, for example, Groupon-like promotions
for health care services based on location.209 Additionally, novel app-based
products such as NFC payment will be used in the health care domain.210 These
new products and services are joined by considerable innovation in the well-
ness space.
Overall most of these products and services fall short of disruptive innova-
tion. However, true disruption may be close at hand as app developers build on
the smartphone reality that most Americans now have a powerful connected
computer with them at all times. As Christensen and colleagues have argued:
“[N]ew-market disruptive innovations . . . occur when characteristics of
existing products limit the number of potential consumers or force consumption
to take place in inconvenient, centralized settings.”211 Smartphones and their
mobile apps take aim at these existing products, aiming for convenient and
decentralized care.
Many disruptive direct-to-consumer products, such as diabetes monitoring
kits, pregnancy tests, and at-home genetic testing kits, point the way forward,
essentially replacing the medical professional with a far lower skilled, but much
cheaper, caregiver and stakeholder—the patient. Mobile’s great promise is in
both improving the quality of care while further reducing friction. The current
health care model involves having patients visit a health care facility where
their data is entered into a database. The data may be objective measurements
and subjective evaluations emanating from both patient and provider. This pro-
cess of visitation, data acquisition, and recording is expensive, inefficient, and
unpleasant. Further, as we learn from other countries and seek to cut costs by
increasing our ratio of preventive to curative care, we need to drastically reduce
the friction accompanying patient interactions with providers. Michael Saylor
analogizes the current hospital-based system to big box stores: “Each one is
designed to have at least one of every kind of specialist on hand.”212 In con-
trast, he argues, “co-location no longer matters so much” when “medical infor-
mation can move, and patients can see specialists on video.”213 Then, “a much
more efficient architecture can be created. The hospital will become much more
of a network, and much less of a big box.”214
208 For example, the following websites easily lend themselves to (or have already become)
mobile apps: ANGIE’S LIST, www.angieslist.com (last visited May 7, 2013); Best Health and
Medical in Chicago, YELP, http://www.yelp.com/c/chicago/health (last visited May 7, 2013);
Avvo Health Has Moved to HealthTap, AVVO HEALTH, http://www.avvo.com/health-infor-
mation?referring_url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.avvo.com%2Ffind-a-doctor%3Fref%3Dhome
page (last visited May 7, 2013); RATEMDS, http://www.ratemds.com (last visited May 7,
2013).
209 See, e.g., Associated Press, Uninsured Turn to Daily Deal Sites for Health Care; People
Relying on Groupon for Dental, Blood Work, Lasik, NYDAILYNEWS.COM (Dec. 30, 2011,
4:11 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/health/uninsured-turn-daily-deal-sites-
health-care-people-relying-groupon-dental-blood-work-lasik-article-1.998989.
210 See, e.g., Near Field Payment Technology to Dominate Mobile World Congress, COM-
PUTERWEEKLY.COM (Feb. 9, 2011, 2:07 PM), http://www.computerweekly.com/news/1280
095104/Near-field-payment-technology-to-dominate-Mobile-World-Congress.
211 CHRISTENSEN, ANTHONY & ROTH, supra note 24, at xvii (emphasis added).
212 SAYLOR, supra note 198, at 156.
213 Id.
214 Id.
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While Internet-based care promises 24/7, location-independent access, its
single interface (a web browser) remains limited. Mobile apps provide more
than ubiquity. First, native apps can provide more sophistication than web
apps.215 Second, the smartphones themselves are packed with sensors (such as
GPS, gyroscopes, accelerometers, touch-sensitive surfaces, microphones, and
cameras) that app developers can leverage through application programming
interfaces.216 Third, new generation mobile devices such as smartphones and
tablets typically have physical interfaces that allow the connection of external
modules (e.g., blood pressure cuffs,217 heat sensors,218 or blood glucose moni-
toring219) to harvest data. Arguably, it is these advances in wearable accesso-
ries that collect biometric data using non-invasive sensors that will provide the
greatest impetus in the development of medical apps.220
Mobile apps seem consistent with the disruptive innovation model. Health
care incumbents do not own the platforms and networks upon which mobile
medical apps are built. Indeed, the smartphone industry’s major players (Apple
and Google) are infamous disrupters of industries, while app developers are
start-ups or, if incumbents, tend to come from wellness, medical device, or
consumer electronics backgrounds. Furthermore, just as smartphones and tab-
lets still undershoot personal computers, mobile medical apps also undershoot
the high technology devices (and interfaces) found in incumbent-owned
facilities.
At the moment, mobile apps lack the range and robustness of traditional
health care. This, of course, may be interpreted as pre-disruption undershooting
by the potentially disruptive innovation. As McNair describes:
Mobile apps’ ability to empower consumers is naturally associated with the
potential to unsafely disintermediate the services of clinically-trained professionals,
from whom consumers might otherwise have sought advice and care. For people who
do not have ready access to those services because of lack of insurance coverage or
215 See, e.g., Max Katz & Tiggzi, Native Apps vs. Mobile Web: Breaking Down the Mobile
Ecosystem, WIRED (Nov. 20, 2012, 1:37 PM), http://www.wired.com/insights/2012/11/
native-apps-vs-mobile-web/.
216 See, e.g., The Best Health & Fitness App on Mobile Premier Awards 2011 According to
the Jury of Industry Experts and as Seen on Dr. Oz Show!, AZUMIO, http://www.azumio.
com/apps/heart-rate (last visited May 7, 2013) (describing heart rate measurement using
iPhone camera); Skin Cancer Self-Exam Mobile App: UMSkinCheck, UOFMHEALTH.ORG,
http://www.uofmhealth.org/patient%20and%20visitor%20guide/my-skin-check-app (last
visited May 7, 2013) (describing skin cancer self-exam and measurement using iPhone
camera).
217 See, e.g., Blood Pressure Monitor, WITHINGS.COM, http://www.withings.com/en/blood
pressuremonitor (last visited May 7, 2013).
218 See, e.g., Satish Misra, iPhone & iPad Peripheral ThermoDock Measures Body Temper-
ature Without Any Body Contact, IMEDICALAPPS (Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.imedicalapps.
com/2012/04/thermodock-temperature-easy-owning-smartphone.
219 See, e.g., IBG STAR, http://www.ibgstar.us (last visited May 7, 2013).
220 Rip Empson, Market for Mobile Health Apps Projected to Quadruple to $400 Million by
2016, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 29, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/11/29/market-for-mobile-
health-apps-projected-to-quadruple-to-400-million-by-2016/.
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shortages of providers or other reasons, “some” medical advice is usually better than
“nothing.”221
If health-related mobile apps operating on platforms, such as smartphones
and tablets, are poised to become a disruptive force, the question arises as to
what could slow their growth? Clearly, the underlying platforms and app stores
(e.g., Google’s Android and Apple’s iOS) are robust and growing at an
extremely high rate.222 Furthermore, health care incumbents looking to block
disruption with their high market concentration have little influence over the
medical mobile apps market.
One answer could be regulation. Generally, mobile apps have grown in an
unregulated space other than, for example, rules applied by the platform own-
ers.223 However, regulation might operate to favor incumbents by slowing
adoption. In 2011, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) published a Draft
Guidance on Mobile Medical Applications.224 The guidance suggested that
products such as smartphone fitness apps would generally remain unregulated,
but that regulation would extend to devices that included patient sensors,
alarms, diagnostics, etc. The FDA approach is to regulate only what it calls a
“mobile medical app,” whether executing on the mobile platform or on a server
that either “is used as an accessory to a regulated medical device” or “trans-
forms a mobile platform into a regulated medical device.”225 The agency’s ulti-
mate responsibility to create a “strategy and recommendations on an
appropriate, risk-based regulatory framework pertaining to health information
technology, including mobile medical applications” was confirmed by the Food
and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act in 2012.226 Although the
FDA seems to be developing some kind of roadmap as to how to approach
medical apps, the sheer numbers, variety, and the lack of clear mapping
between types of apps and device classifications may make regulation a daunt-
ing task.227 For now, the agency seems happy to keep its regulatory footprint
modest as it watches the market develop.
The second regulatory model that could come into play is the state-based
licensure system. Primarily controlled by incumbents, these boards can be used
to stifle innovation and perceived potential competition.228 The transmission of
221 Douglas S. McNair, FDA Facing Huge Task in Regulating Mobile Medical Apps,
CERNER BLOG (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.cerner.com/blog/fda_facing_huge_task_in_regu-
lating_mobile_medical_apps.
222 See, e.g., Aaron Smith, Nearly Half of American Adults are Smartphone Owners, PEW
INTERNET (Mar. 1, 2012), http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2012/Smartphone-Update-2012.
aspx.
223 See, e.g., App Review, APPLE DEVELOPER, https://developer.apple.com/appstore/guide
lines.html (last visited May 7, 2013).
224 Draft Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff—Mobile Medical
Applications, FDA (July 21, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregulationand
guidance/guidancedocuments/ucm263280.htm.
225 Id. at Part III.C.
226 Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-144,
§ 618, 126 Stat. 1063 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
227 McNair, supra note 221.
228 See, e.g., DIABETES-WARRIOR.NET, http://www.diabetes-warrior.net (last visited May 7,
2013) (blog about the Paleolithic diet that is under threat from the North Carolina Board of
Dietetics/Nutrition for unlicensed practice); see also Paul Sherman, Can State Licensing
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patient data to a physician from a patient’s mobile medical app potentially
could be considered a telemedical relationship requiring a special purpose
license.229 A physician’s response to patient input in an app potentially could
implicate diagnosis or prescribing without a physical examination.230 Further, a
biometric sensor-enabled smartphone probably will transmit an algorithm-
based diagnosis across state lines leading to an incumbent arguing unauthorized
practice of medicine.231 The macro question is whether state regulators will
attempt to intervene in the medical apps space or will cede regulatory authority
to the FDA (and FCC).
Asch and Volpp argue that “[i]n the future, successful doctors, hospitals,
and health systems will shift their activities from delivering health services
within their walls toward a broader range of approaches that deliver health.”232
The challenge they identify is moving from a “product-oriented industry to a
customer-oriented one[.]”233 Leveraging the power of rapidly evolving mobile
computers may well be the answer. Conceptually and technically, mobile apps
are part of the rapidly expanding Internet of Things.234 They also move us
closer to Eric Topol’s Homo Digitus235 or Frank Moss’s “digital nervous sys-
tem” comprising “inconspicuous wireless sensors worn on your body and
placed in your home [which] continuously monitor your vital signs and track
the daily activities that affect your health.”236 Moving health care (even just
some health care) out of institutions and into patients’ own local body networks
powered by smartphones could be truly disruptive.
VIII. CONCLUSION
HIT has failed to become a major disruptive force in health care delivery.
Indeed, its missteps and uncertain adoption curve are indicative of its role as a
metaphor for the problems that beset health care generally, particularly its spi-
Boards Ban Ordinary Advice on the Internet?, NAT’L L.J. (May 30, 2012), http://www.law.
com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202556531494&Can_state_licensing_boards_ban_ordi-
nary_advice_on_the_Internet_&slreturn=20130101200418.
229 See Telemedicine Overview: Board-by-Board Approach, FED’N STATE MED. BOARDS
(Aug. 2012), http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/grpol_telemedicine_licensure.pdf.
230 See Internet Prescribing Language: State-by-State Overview, FED’N STATE MED.
BOARDS (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/InternetPrescribing-law&policylanguage.
pdf.
231 See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 334.010 (2012) (State law prohibiting the unauthorized
practice of medicine and the practice of medicine across state lines).
232 David A. Asch & Kevin G. Volpp, What Business Are We In? The Emergence of Health
as the Business of Health Care, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 888, 889 (2012).
233 Id.
234 See Kevin Ashton, That “Internet of Things” Thing, RFID J. (July 22, 2009), http://
www.rfidjournal.com/article/view/4986; Michael Chui, Markus Loffler & Roger Roberts,
The Internet of Things, MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST. (Mar. 2010), http://www.mckinsey.com/
insights/mgi/research/technology_and_innovation/the_internet_of_things.
235 ERIC TOPOL, THE CREATIVE DESTRUCTION OF MEDICINE: HOW THE DIGITAL REVOLU-
TION WILL CREATE BETTER HEALTH CARE 226–43 (2012).
236 Frank Moss, Our High-Tech Health-Care Future, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2011, at A35.
According to Moss’s vision, based on data collected, the patient would receive automated
advice or an online consultation rather than, or as triage mechanisms ahead of, office visits.
Id.
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raling costs, reduced access, and market failures. Going forward, any positive
disruptive future for HIT will depend on fundamental changes in health care,
the appearance of truly novel transformative technologies, or a fundamental re-
thinking of the health information data model. Worst case, it may be that health
care is so hopelessly fragmented and hideously complex that market failure is
endemic and beyond the disruptive reach of HIT or any other market-based
solution.
Primarily, this Article has challenged the conventional transformation nar-
rative that surrounds initiatives such as the ARRA-based HIT subsidy. While
some gains in quality will result from the implementation of comprehensive
HIT systems, little will change regarding health care access or costs. Unfortu-
nately, the subsidy model has failed to reverse the pattern of most providers
implementing quite basic EMR systems. The decade ahead will see a struggle
to reduce the delta between siloed EMRs and transformative HIT. In the
meantime, any positive gains from HIT may be offset by a growing technology
gap between advanced providers (those who moved early to attest to MU or
who have already made radical structural changes such as by integrating verti-
cally) and those who are ineligible, culturally unwilling, or financially unable
to meet the MU conditions.237
Just as with existing high technology health care like MRIs, the current
generation of HIT is poised to be only a sustaining rather than disruptive tech-
nology. Notwithstanding that we live in a world of disruption, health care is
more akin to the stubborn television domain, where similarly complex relation-
ships and market concentrations have slowed the forces of disruption. Those
seeking the transformation of health care may have to seek a different muse.
There are three potential exceptions to this pessimistic conclusion. First,
because advanced HIT is not a good fit for episodic health care delivery, we
may be experiencing a holding pattern while health care rights itself. With
ACA upheld by the Supreme Court and the subsequent election favoring Presi-
dent Obama, it is time to see whether ACA initiatives such as ACOs and
PCMH will foster broader HIT implementation. Second, the 2010 PCAST
report was correct, and the health care data model is broken. Partially as a
result, Google Health failed. If Stage Three of the MU subsidy program or
some other initiative can fundamentally rethink interoperability (and we can fix
the privacy issues), investment and innovation could migrate to data services
built on top of shareable data.
The final and potentially most interesting exception may be personal
health technologies, everything from personal health records to mobile apps:
products that are themselves built on hugely disruptive platforms and champi-
oned by some of our most disruptive companies. Leveraging the growing com-
puting power of smartphones and linkable biometric sensors, these apps hold
the promise for “healthcare everywhere.” And, unlike other HIT, they qualify
as disruptive with their initial undershooting, low price, and convenience. If
HIT is to bring about a tectonic shift rather than exist as a high technology
237 See Genevra Pittman, Poorer Hospitals May Suffer from Medicare Changes, REUTERS
(July 16, 2012, 4:40 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/16/us-hospitals-medicare-
idUSBRE86F14K20120716 (noting likelihood of quality measures adversely affecting
safety-net hospitals).
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metaphor for health care’s market failures, this may be where the transforma-
tion of health care will commence.
